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This Article argues that the per cwam is a misused practice that is at odds with the
mdividualizednatureofthe American common law system, frustratingefforts to holdmdividual
judges accountableandinzhibiting the development ofthe law Thus, the use ofthe percunam in
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INTRODUCTION

In 1986, the United States Supreme Court heard Bazemore v
Fiday to resolve allegations of racial discrimination.' The Court
issued its ruling per curiam. Given the multiple voiced opinions,
however, that label was meaningless.2 The Court's holding relied on
two concurring opinions, one authored by Justice Brennan and joined
by the whole Court,' and the second authored by Justice White and
joined by four other Justices.! Perhaps the Court was attempting to
hide behind the per curiam label, or perhaps the Court wanted to show
a united front on an issue of such magnitude. Because the separate
authors of the concurring and dissenting opinions were identified,
however, as they always are, and because the Court placed such heavy
emphasis on the majority's reasoning, the Court failed to accomplish
either goal. Regardless of the anticipated effect of the decision,
Bazemore demonstrates how far the per curiam opinion has strayed
1.

478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam).

2.
Id.; see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (involving an
opinion "by the court" in which there were five separate concurrences and four separate
dissents); JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 214-15 (2011)

(referring to the "one-paragraph unsigned opinion" in Furman and stating that Furman's
"brief per curiam statement was followed by 231 pages of opinions, one opinion for each of
the nine members of the Court").
3.
Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
Id.at 407 (White, J., concurring).
4.
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from its original usage as a fast and easy way to dispose of simple,
procedural matters that were to have no effect on the status of the law.
Per curiam-literally translated from Latin to "by the court"-is
defined by Black Law Dictionaryas "[a]n opinion handed down by
an appellate court without identifying the individual judge who wrote
the opinion."' Accordingly, the author of a per curiam opinion is
meant to be institutional rather than individual, attributable to the court
as an entity rather than to a single judge. Since its original use, the per
curiam has been used to expand desegregation from public schools to
other public venues,' to supply the constitutional standard for the
regulation of speech,' to strike down portions of a campaign finance
law,9 to make the Court a de facto censorship board for things it
deemed obscene," and even to decide the outcome of a presidential
election." Today, the per curiam is a misused practice that is at odds
with the individualized nature of the American common law system,
frustrating efforts to hold individual judges accountable and inhibiting
the development of the law. Thus, this Article argues that the use of
the per curiam in courts of last resort, including de facto courts of last
resort such as the federal courts of appeals, should be limited to a very
narrow class of opinions in which the use of formulaic, boilerplate
language has already extinguished any sense of individuality. The per
curiam is inappropriate, however, when the opinion begins to expound
on the particular facts or law at issue.
Part II of the Article examines the history of the per curiam
opinion, including its early usage in nineteenth-century Supreme Court
cases, its application to more substantive cases and decisions with
separate opinions, and its current trends. Part III argues that, because
appellate judges are held accountable primarily through their
individual role in judicial decision making, all of their opinions must
be attributed. Part IV explores the individual role of appellate judges
in making and explaining the law, arguing that individuality pervades
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Peculiarityof Per Curiam: In the Georgia Supreme
5.
Court, 52 MERCER L. REv 1, 2 (2000).
6.

BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1201 (9th ed. 2009).

Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf courses);
7.
Mayor of Balt. v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (beaches).
8.
Brandenburg v.Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
9.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam).
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 n.3 (1973) (writing that the per curiam10.
based procedure for resolving obscenity cases, used thirty-one times to summarily reverse
convictions from 1967 to 1973, "has cast us in the role of an unreviewable board of
censorship for the 50 States, subjectively judging each piece of material brought before us").
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
11.
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the substance and language of judicial opinions. Consequently, the
author of those decisions must be identified for the public and the legal
profession to have an accurate understanding of the law and to frame
legal arguments effectively. Part V identifies the narrow set of
exceptions in which the per curiam is appropriate.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

TraditionalUsage of the PerCuran Opinion

Traditionally, the per curiam was used to signal that a case was
uncontroversial, obvious, and did not require a substantial opinion.12
The early usage of the per curiam label, which first appeared in a
published Supreme Court decision in 1862, was consistent with the
unity among the Justices that its name connotes." Over the next few
decades, the Court generally used the per curiam to dispose briefly of
standard proceedings, such as grants or denials of certiorari, dismissals
for lack of jurisdiction, and various motion decisions. 4 By the turn of
the century, the Court also routinely issued per curiams for brief
affirmances and reversals of lower court decisions." These early
opinions often comprised only a sentence or two, rarely more than a
paragraph, and never displayed disagreement among the Justices.16
Beginning in 1909 with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose
strongly worded separate opinions earned him the moniker "the Great
Dissenter," per curiam opinions began to feature dissents." The per
12.

Stephen L. Washy et al., The Per Curiam Opinion: Its Nature and Functions, 76

JUDICATURE 29, 36 (1992).

13.
See Laura Krugman Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore: The Historyof the Supreme
Courth Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 NEB. L. REv. 517, 521-22 (2000) (noting that
Mesa v. United States, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 721 (1862) (per curiam), was the first published per
curiam opinion). The per curiam, however, was used before Mesa in several unreported
cases. 131 U.S. app. at xi, xvii (1888). Only one of these opinions was ever published. West
v Brashear,131 U.S. app. at lxvi (1839) (per curiam), was not printed until it appeared in an
1889 collection of previously unpublished opinions that was compiled for the Court's
centennial. Ray, supra, at 521-22.
14. Ray, supranote 13, at 522.
Id The Supreme Court first cited to precedent in a per curiam reversal in
15.
Sherman v Robertson, 136 U.S. 570 (1889) (per curiam). Ray, supranote 13, at 522.
16.
See Ray, supra note 13, at 522-23 (reasoning that without discussion there could
be no conflict of opinion).
17.
See Arthur J. Jacobson, The Ghostwiters, in THE LONGEST NIGHT: POLEMICS
AND PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTION 2000, at 189, 196-97 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Michel

Rosenfeld eds., 2002) (observing that Justices William H. Moody and Edward D. White
joined Justice Holmes and "established that per curiam and dissent . .. could coexist in the
same decision"); Ray, supra note 13, at 524-25 (citing Chi., Burlington, & Quincy Ry. Co. v.
Williams, 214 U.S. 492 (1909) (per curiam), in which Justice Holmes dissented from a threepage per curiam that set forth the certified questions of law from the lower court).
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curiam label-which "falters at its inception" because the opinion "by
the court" is necessarily written by some individual justice"-also
began to falter at its conclusion, no longer denoting a resolute bloc of
complete institutional support. The practice of writing separately from
per curiam opinions was not fully embraced, however, until President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's nominees began to fill the bench, bringing a
strong sense of judicial individuality and a reluctance to suppress their
views for chimerical judicial solidarity." Indeed, whereas "[t]he Court
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ...

deliberately

submerged the idea of a personal voice in the fiction of a collective
voice," Roosevelt's Court "never hesitated to disturb consensus
opinions with statements of individual views."20 By mid-century,
Justices dissenting from or concurring with a supposedly unanimous
and straightforward per curiam opinion had become a well-established
practice.2
Along with this shift from unanimity to discord, the per curiam
has also seen shifts in usage since its original employment in more
routine, procedural matters. By the 1930s, the Court had begun using
the per curiam to decide substantive cases accompanied by oral
argument and to develop more thorough opinions.22 The per curiam
not only allowed the Court to quickly adjudicate these more
substantive cases but also to signify to the public that the issues in
them were easily resolved and required little explanation.2 3 While it
continues to expand the use of the per curiam to more substantive

18. Sentell, supranote 5, at 2.
19. Ray, supranote 13, at 532.
20. Id. at 518, 527. As Ray succinctly writes, in the late 1930s "[p]er curiam
opinions increasingly came with dissents attached, creating an oxymoronic form, one that
simultaneously insisted on both institutional consensus and individual disagreement." Id. at
520.
21.
E.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 396 U.S. 13, 15 (1969) (per curiam) (Black, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per
curiam) (Black, Harlan, & Stewart, JJ., concurring); Eichel v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 375 U.S.
253, 256 (1963) (per curiam) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Mackey v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U.S. 384, 388 (1960) (per curiam) (Clark, J., dissenting, joined by
Harlan & Whittaker, JJ.); Bowles v. United States, 319 U.S. 33, 36 (1943) (per curiam)
(Jackson, J., dissenting, joined by Reed, J.); McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419,
423 (1938) (per curiam) (Black, J., dissenting).
22. See Ray, supra note 13, at 523 (identifying four cases from the 1934 Supreme
Court Term in which per curiams were issued after oral argument, and commenting that
"[t]he decisions are unexceptional in themselves, but they represent the adaptation of the per
curiam to a new use, the resolution of significant issues in a condensed format").
- 23. Id.
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cases, the Court still employs the per curiam in cases that are routine
and uncontroversial to a majority of the Justices.24
B.

Modem Shifts in Usage

Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court
expanded the role of the per curiam, fashioning it as a strategic device
to resolve time-sensitive cases quickly, as a protective shield from
controversial issues, and as a way to make new law by indirection.2
Through the per curiam, the Court at times also aimed to convey a
message of consensus while engaging in more complicated and
substantive decision making.26
The Supreme Court has used the per curiam to adjudicate cases
needing urgent resolution, such as those involving military and
national security interests. In Exparte Quin,27 for example, the Court
issued a brief per curiam opinion as a means to deliver a prompt
decision during wartime to sustain the legitimacy of the military trial
of eight German saboteurs.28 The Court released a more detailed
opinion a few months later, but six of the eight saboteurs had been
sentenced to death and were executed a few days after the release of
the first opinion.29 Similarly, in New York Times Co. v United States
24. Wasby et al., supra note 12, at 36-37. Cardozo suggested that there were three
categories of cases: (1) those that are "predestined" and can be resolved in only one way;
(2) those that involve no dispute about the law itself, but rather its application to the specific
facts of a case; and (3) those that will impact the development of the law. RUGGERO J.
ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 19-20 (2d ed. 2009). According to United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit Judge Aldisert, a per curiam opinion exists "somewhere
between an unpublished or memorandum opinion and a full-blown signed published opinion.
[It is used] when the rule of law and its application to relatively simple facts are clear, or
when the law has been made clear by an appellate decision subsequent to the trial court's
judgment." Id.at 21. Aldisert advises:
A signed or per curiam opinion should be published in all cases that
contribute to the progressive development of the law. However, you must
distinguish between those cases requiring interpretation and those simply requiring
application of existing interpretation to new facts. The latter may not contribute to
the progress of the law. If it does not, it should be disposed of by memorandum
opinion or judgment order.
Id. at 27.
25. See generally Laura Krugman Ray, The History of the Per Curiam Opinion:
Consensus and IndividualExpression on the Supreme Court, 27 J. Su. CT. HisT. 176, 177
(2002) (discussing the evolution of the per curiam opinion).
26. Ray, supranote 13, at 536.
27. 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (per curiam).
28.
See Ray, supra note 13, at 537 (indicating that the Court issued a brief per curiam
one day after hearing oral argument at a Special Term).
29. See id. (stating that Chief Justice Stone worked on the full opinion in solitude
while summering in New Hampshire).
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(PentagonPapers), the Court faced the need to act quickly in deciding
the appropriateness of enjoining the New York Times and the
Washington Post from publishing portions of the top-secret Pentagon
Papers that potentially posed serious harm to national security.' In
reaching a swift resolution, the Court separated the result in the case
from its reasoning and issued a three paragraph per curiam that "said
almost nothing of substance."32 The only paragraph dealing with the
merits referred to three trivial precedents and two lower court rulings,
followed by the Court succinctly noting its agreement." The per
curiam in Pentagon Papers was followed by six divergent concurring
opinions.34 This demonstrated the Court's determination to reach a
decision under urgent circumstances, even in the absence of agreement
regarding the reasoning behind it."
At times the per curiam has been a convenient tool for the
Supreme Court in deciding controversial cases, because "[w]ith no
Justice signing the opinion, there was no individual to be blamed for
evading the tough questions."" In Toolson v New York Yankees, Inc.,"
the Court used the per curiam to avoid reexamining the underlying
rationale for baseball's federal antitrust exemption." By relying on
precedent established in FederalBaseball Club v NationalLeague of
ProfessionalBaseball Clubs," which exempted baseball from federal
30. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
See Ray, supra note 13, at 551 (explaining that the Justices were highly divided
31.
on whether to grant certiorari, with the controlling vote belonging to Justice Stewart, who
proposed to keep the injunction in place but to hear the cases immediately the next day); see
also DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE PENTAGON
PAPERS CASE 301 (1996) (noting that the Justices did not have ample time before the summer
recess to produce a majority opinion they could support).
32. Ray, supra note 13, at 552.
33. PentagonPapers,403 U.S. at 714.
34. Id. (Black, J., concurring); id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 724
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 727 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 730 (White, J.,
concurring); idat 740 (Marshall, J., concurring).
35. See Ray, sepra note 13, at 552-54 (discussing that each of the six concurring
opinions had a "particular slant" on the issue). But see Jacobson, supra note 17, at 202
(contrasting the Pentagon Papers per curiam opinion with Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958), in which all of the Justices signed their names, and stating that the six Justices who
joined the per curiam could have done the same).
36. Ray, supa note 13, at 538; seeMichelle Friedland et al., Opinionsofthe Court by
Anonymous, S.F. ATTORNEY (BAR Ass'N S.F.), Summer 2008, at 38, 39 (explaining that
per curiams in controversial cases can "depersonalize the decision" and strengthen the
institutional voice).
37. 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
38. Ray, supra note 13, at538.
39. 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922) (holding that baseball did not constitute commerce
and therefore was exempt from federal antitrust laws).
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antitrust laws, and by deferring to Congress to change the status of
baseball, the Court avoided confronting the issue and the need to
formulate a developed opinion.40
The cases following the landmark decision in Brown v Board of
Education41 are another instance in which the Supreme Court utilized
the per curiam in controversial cases, extending its desegregation
ruling incrementally beyond education to other fields, such as public
beaches," golf courses,43 and bus systems." These per curiams failed
to discuss the rationale of the cases, or even the subject matter.45 The
Court's decision in New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v
Detiege, for example, ended segregation in public housing without
referring to any precedent, merely stating, "The judgment is
affirmed."' 6 The Court constructed "a bridge of per curiams" to extend
desegregation, implying that each subsequent case inevitably followed
from its predecessor to reach a certain conclusion.47 By omitting legal
reasoning from the per curiam decisions, the Court prevented a
renewed attack on Brown's precedent and furthered desegregation
throughout the South.48
More recently, the Supreme Court in Bush v Gore9 issued a per
curiam to defuse charges of political bias in deciding the winner of the
2000 presidential election.o Despite the appearance of unity provided
by the per curiam label, there was publically acknowledged discord
among the Justices as evidenced by the accompanying five signed
opinions." Critics charged that the use of the per curiam in this case
40. Ray, supra note 13, at 538.
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. Mayor of Balt. v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (affirming the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision to desegregate public
beaches).
43. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (affirming the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision to desegregate golf courses).
44. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (affirming district court
ruling that Alabama statutes requiring bus segregation were unconstitutional); see Wasby et
al., supm note 12, at 37 (recognizing that per curiam opinions were also used to extend
Fourteenth Amendment rights in finding segregated courtroom seating unconstitutional).
45. Ray, supra note 13, at 539.
46. 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam).
47. Ray, supra note 13, at 540.
48. Id.
49. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
50. See Ray, supra note 13, at 569, 575 (concluding that the use of the per curiam
indicated that the opinion was depersonalized, putting the Supreme Court above politics).
See id.at 570-71 (observing that the opinion included one concurrence and four
51.
dissents, with only Justices O'Connor and Kennedy not signing their names to any part of the
separate opinions).

2012]

PER CURLAM OPINIONS

1205

was improper because it "failed to package the majority opinion as a
restrained solution, based on a substantial consensus."52
The Supreme Court has also used the per curiam to create new
law. In Brandenburg v Ohio," for example, the Court overturned the
defendant's conviction for statements, made at a Ku Klux Klan
meeting, that violated an Ohio statute prohibiting the advocacy of
violence.54 Chief Justice Warren assigned the task of completing the
Brandenburg opinion to Justice Brennan after its original author,
Justice Fortas, resigned from the Court." Although Justice Brennan
made seemingly inconsequential changes to the earlier draft, his new
language significantly impacted First Amendment doctrine." The per
curiam enabled Justice Brennan to do so anonymously.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has continuously used the per
curiam for certain brief dispositions, such as summary dispositions on
the merits.57 These decisions are often particularly opaque to the extent
that they do not give any explanation or reasoning, but instead simply
state the result." The Supreme Court also issues per curiam decisions
52. See id. at 575 (depicting the Court's use of the per curiam as "more aggressive
and less successful" compared to its use in remanding for clarification in Bush v. Palm Beach
Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam)); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v.
Hsub and Its Disguises: FreeingBush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors,115 HARv. L. REv
170, 173 & n.2 (2001) (noting that prominent scholars, including Alan M. Dershowitz and
Vincent Bugliosi, questioned the Court's motives).
53. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
54. Bernard Schwartz, JusticeBrennan and the Brandenburg Decision-A Lawgiver
inAction, 79 JUDICATURE 24, 27 (1995).
55.
SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 318

(2010).
56. Ray, supra note 13, at 542-43; see infra notes 228-239 and accompanying text
(describing Justice Brennan's redraft of Justice Fortas's original opinion in Bmndenburg and
its significant impact on First Amendment free speech doctrine).
57.

See, e.g., EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 349 (9th ed.

2007) (indicating that the most controversial of these dispositions occurs where the Court
grants certiorari, addresses the merits and facts of the case, and then either reverses or affirms
the lower court's judgment without allowing the parties to file briefs or present oral
arguments).
See Steven Brannock & Sarah Weinzierl, Confronting a PCA: Fmndhg a Path
58.
Around a Brick Wall, 32 STETSON L. REv. 367, 367-68 (2003) (detailing the use of "per
curiam affirmances" in the Florida Supreme Court, in which the court simply affirms the
lower court decision without explanation); Note, Supreme Court Per Ciulam Practice: A
Critique, 69 HARv. L. REv. 707, 722 (1956) (explaining the confusion that Supreme Court
memorandum per curiam opinions create regarding their precedential value and the status of
the law). For further discussion of the per curiam affirmance, see generally Domenic L.
Massari III, EstablishingNew Criteria for Conflict Certiran in Per CuiarnDistrict Court
Decisions: A FirstStep Toward a Definition ofPower,29 U. FLA. L. REv. 335 (1977); Tobias
Weiss, WhatPricePerCwim?, 1995 TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 23. Justice Stevens has commented
that summary reversals show 'how ineffectively the Court is supervising its discretionary
docket,' i.e., by deciding cases 'not of sufficient importance to warrant full briefing and
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when it grants certiorari, vacates the lower court's decision, and
remands the case; this is known as a GVR (grant, vacate, remand)
order. The Court issues hundreds of GVRs every year, either in the
form of orders or opinions." Most GVRs are orders and thus are not
per curiam; however, a GVR is issued as a per curiam when the
Court's language expands beyond the formulaic language of these
orders." A permutation of this practice occurs when the Court has
previously granted certiorari and heard arguments but then decides to
vacate and remand.62 The Supreme Court similarly uses the per curiam
to chastise indigent litigants for filing frivolous claims and to deny
future in forma paupens petitions." As with GVRs, the majority of
these prospective denials are issued as orders with boilerplate
language.' When the Court discusses the specific facts of the case or
refers to a separate opinion, however, these dispositions are issued as
per curiam opinions." Finally, the Court may issue a per curiam
opinion when it dismisses certiorari as improvidently granted (DIGs),
generally issuing an average of three such opinions per Term." The

argument' and 'not worthy of an opinion signed by a Member of this Court."' GRESSMAN ET
AL., supm note 57, at 353 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. McCluskey, 458 U.S. 966, 971-72 (1982)
(per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Further, Justice Stevens noted that per curiam opinions
issued without briefing and oral argument contribute to "the ever-increasing
impersonalization and bureaucratization of the federal judicial system" and threaten "the
quality of our work." McCluskey, 458 U.S. at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. SeeAaron-Andrew P Bruhl, The Supreme Courth ControvemialGVRs-Andan
Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REv. 711, 715, 717 (2009) (indicating that, in the 2006 Term, the
Court issued 250 GVRs and in the 2007 Term it issued 200 GVRs).
60. See id at 717 (recognizing that the majority of the 2006 and 2007 GVRs were
boilerplate orders).
61. Id This practice is often controversial. See, e.g, Youngblood v. West Virginia,
547 U.S. 867, 870-71 (2006) (per curiam) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (chastising the Court for an
inappropriate use of the GVR and listing the situations in which he believes GVRs are
appropriate).
62. Eg., Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (per curiam); Dep't of
State v. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc., 519 U.S. 1 (1996) (per
curiam).
63.

See, e.g., IRA P. ROBBINS, HABEAS CORPUS CHECKLISTS 867-72 (2010) (noting the

Supreme Court's strong language regarding frivolous in forma pauperis litigation and
identifying key per curiam opinions issued in these matters).
64. E.g., Shahin v. Strosser, 131 S. Ct. 1808 (2011).
65. Eg, In re Whitaker, 513 U.S. 1 (1994) (per curiam); In re Anderson, 511 U.S.
364 (1994) (per curiam).
66. GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 358; Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely, The
Supreme Court and the DIG: An Empincal and InstitutionalAnalysis, 2005 Wis. L. REv.
1421, 1424.
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Court resorts to this practice when it reconsiders its basis for granting
review and determines that none existed.
In sum, the Supreme Court issues a significant number of per
curiam dispositions each Term. In the first six years of Chief Justice
Roberts's tenure, almost nine percent of the Court's full opinions were
per curiams." In the last six years of the Rehnquist Court, per curiam
decisions accounted for just over eight percent of the Court's
opinions." The prevalence of issuing unattributed opinions in cases
involving more than formulaic, boilerplate language raises questions
about its impact on judicial accountability and the development of the
law.
III. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
In the American legal system, disclosure of a court's reasoning in
published opinions is both how the judiciary asserts its authority and
the means through which it is monitored and controlled."o William
Cranch, the second reporter for the Supreme Court, wrote in the
67. See GREssMAN ET AL., supm note 57, at 358-62 (listing specific reasons that the
Court has provided for issuing a DIG).
68. See Stat Pack for October Term 2010, SCOTUSBLOG, 42 (June 28, 2011), http://
sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SB OTIO_stat_pack-fmal.pdf (5 of
80 opinions with enough reasoning to be considered "full opinions" were per curiam in the
2009 Term); The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-The Statistics, 124 HARv. L. REv. 411, 411
(2010) (14 of 87); The Supreme Court, 2008 Term-The Statistics, 123 HARV. L. REv. 382,
382 (2009) (4 of 78); The Supreme Court,2007 Term-The Statistics, 122 HARv L. REv. 516,
516 (2008) (3 of 70); The Supreme Court,2006 Term-The Statistics, 121 HARv. L. REv. 436,
436 (2007) (6 of 73); The Supreme Court,2005 Term-The Statistics, 120 HAR. L. REv. 372,
372 (2006) (12 of 81); The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV
415, 420 (2005) (4 of 79).
69. See The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-The Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REv 497,497
(2004) (7 of 83); The Supreme Court,2002 Term-The Statistics, 117 HARv. L. REV 480,480
(2003) (7 of 78); The Supreme Court,2001 Term-The Statistics, 116 HAR. L. REv 453, 453
(2002) (6 of 8 1); The Supreme Court,2000 Term-The Statistics,115 HARY L. REv 539, 539
(2001) (9 of 86); The Supreme Court,1999 Term-The Statistics,114 HARv L. REV. 390, 390
(2000) (4 of 77); The Supreme Cour, 1998 Term-The Statistics,113 HARv. L. REV. 400,400
(1999) (6 of 81).
70.

See MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE

ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 312 (2004) ("American judicial
accountability and control are ... produced ... by requiring the public disclosure of judicial
discourse and reasoning."); SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAw:
REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 24 (2003) (asserting that the power of the
Supreme Court to make binding law via judicial decisions is possible only through the
publication and distribution of those decisions); see also Edward Lazarus, The Supreme
Courth Excessive Secrecy: Why It Isn't Meriteo FINDLAW (Sept. 30, 2004), http://writ.
news.findlaw.cornlazarus/20040930.html ("Unless we achieve some window into the Court's
internal decisionmaking, we have no way of evaluating whether the Court is, in fact, living up
to [its] constitutional trust.").
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preface to his first volume, "Every case decided is a check upon the
judge."" According to Justice Brennan, this is so because the courts
"have a duty to explain [in their decisions] why and how a given rule
has come to be."7 The coherence and clarity of these explanations
allow the public, the media, and the legal profession to determine the
judiciary's consistency and fidelity to the law." In this way, judicial
decisions shoulder much of the burden for legitimating the judiciary. 4
While legislation is the result of a prescribed process, when laws
originate in the judiciary they have the potential to be more opaque
because the process by which they are created is not directly
accessible.7 ' The merit of the transparency of the procedure is just as
vital as the integrity of the resulting law itself." A thorough judicial
opinion can ensure this transparency by bringing the public into the
process. When an opinion is unsigned, however, it loses some of its
apparent transparency, because the public is unable to associate the
anonymous author with the reasoning contained in the opinion.
The process through which the Supreme Court reports its
decisions to the public has evolved over time." While some of its
earliest decisions were issued seiatm, a majority of the opinions
delivered before John Marshall's ascent to Chief Justice were per
71.
5 U.S. (I Cranch) iii (1804).
72. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 435
(1986). Justice Brennan went on to assert that this duty serves as a check on the judiciary
analogous to the electoral process in the political branches. Id
73. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at iii-iv (maintaining that, when a judge explains his
opinions publicly, he "can not [sic] decide a similar case differently, without strong reasons,
which, for his own justification, he will wish to make public"); Brennan, supra note 72, at
435 (contending that, because courts must derive legal principles rather than declaring law,
explanations of the courts' reasoning "restrains judges and keeps them accountable to the law
and to the principles that are the source ofjudicial authority").
74. LASSER, supma note 70, at 300-01; see KENNETH JOST, THE SUPREME COURT A To
Z 345 (3d ed. 2003) ("The Supreme Court [Jiustices believe that their opinions and orders
must speak for themselves.").
75. This opacity undermines respect for the legal system itself. Cf Ira P. Robbins,
Justice by the Numbers: The Supreme Court and the Rule of Four-OrIs It Five, 36
SUFFOLK U. L. REv 1, 30 (2002) (advocating for transparency in the context of the
unpublished internal rules of the Supreme Court).
76. Brennan, supra note 72, at 435. Further, accountable and transparent judges are
the true marks of a democratic government. LASSER, supranote 70, at 338.
77. See Brennan, supra note 72, at 435 (explaining that courts have a duty to provide
the public with the rationale for their judicial rulings).
78.
See, e.g., James Markham, Note, Against IndividuallySigned Opinions,56 DUKE
L.J. 923, 928-31 (2006) (recounting the history of the individually attributed opinion in the
Supreme Court from the Marshall Court's practice of delivering only one opinion in the Chief
Justice's name to the rise of separate opinions, the entrenchment of the individually signed
opinion, and the current tendency of Justices to write separately for seemingly personal
reasons).
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curiam opinions-opinions from the body as a whole rather than an
individual Justice, although the Court did not use this term.79 Upon
becoming Chief Justice, Marshall promoted his belief that portraying
the Court as an undivided body would enhance its prestige; thus,
decisions were generally delivered by individual Justices speaking for
the entire Court, and usually by Chief Justice Marshall himself." This
method drew sharp criticism from Thomas Jefferson and his
Republican colleagues, who thought that it limited the accountability
of the individual Justices by "shield[ing] compleatly [sic]" their
"personal reputation."" Jefferson believed that, in order to maintain
adequate control over the judiciary, all opinions should be issued
seiatin, with each Justice required to articulate his views on the
particular issue before the Court.82 Only this method, Jefferson argued,
would provide the public with an adequate check on judges who
otherwise could be derelict or capricious in their duties. Despite
79. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme
Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 145-46 & n.45 (1999). Twenty-four percent of
these early opinions were issued seiatim. Id.at 140.
80.
See Richard Lowell Nygaard, The MalignedPer Curiam: A FreshLook atan Old
Colleague, 5 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 41, 45 (1994-1995) ("Marshall was concerned with
impressing upon the country the Supreme Court's unity on issues, not its divisions in
individual philosophy. He sought to place emphasis on the serious nature of the Court's
decisions, not on how scintillating or sparkling the language and writing style of its individual
members might be."); see also Kelsh, supra note 79, at 141 (observing that, although this
practice was used at least three times by Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, Marshall made it
common practice).
81.
Kelsh, supra note 79, at 145-46. Jefferson believed that one Justice speaking for
the entire Court
"saves [judges] the trouble of developing their opinion methodically and even of making
up an opinion at all.... It would certainly be right to abandon this practice in order to
give to our citizens one and all, that confidence in their judges which must be so
desirable to the judges themselves, and so important to the cement of the union."
Id (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), quoted in
DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON, THE FIRST DISSENTER: THE CAREER AND
PHILOSOPHY OF A JEFFERSONIAN JUDGE 169 (1954)).

82. See Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinon in the Supreme Court A History of
JudicialDishttegration,44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 194 (1959) (noting that Jefferson believed each
Justice should announce his individual views in each case so that Congress can hold each one
accountable); see also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 1202 (defining seiatim

opinions as "[a] series of opinions written individually by each judge on the bench, as
opposed to a single opinion speaking for the court as a whole").
83. See Brennan, supra note 72, at 433 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), quoted in ZoBell, supra note 82, at 194) (addressing
Jefferson's criticism that unanimous opinions may close the "marketplace of ideas" and
actually consist of "a majority of one, delivered as if unanimous, and with the silent
acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a crafty chiefjudge, who sophisticates the law to
his own mind, by the turn of his own reasoning").
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Jefferson's reservations, the Marshall Court laid the foundation for the
current system of a single Justice delivering the opinion of the Court,
with the other Justices free to write separately to express disagreement
with the majority or to offer alternate theories, which essentially
eradicated the use of seiatim opinions.8 4
A.

Accountablityand the Signed Opinion

Today, individually attributed opinions and publicly recorded
votes are the primary instruments for holding appellate judges and
justices accountable, because they are the sole chronicle of their
work." The signed opinion provides the public with a window into the
inner workings of the courts that fosters judicial accountability through
an environment of individual responsibility." Many prominent jurists
agree with this characterization. For example, as then-Circuit Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg remarked, "Disclosure of votes and opinion
writers may nourish a judge's ego, his or her sense of individuality; but
if our system affords the judge personal satisfaction, it also serves to
hold the individual judge accountable."" Thomas Jefferson likely
would have agreed, because the per curiam "shield[s] the [Justices]
compleatly [sic]."" He argued that "[t]he practice is certainly

84. See generaly Kelsh, supra note 79 (examining the Supreme Court's historical
methods for delivering its opinions).
85. See, e.g., Maurice Kelman, The Forked Path of DissenA 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 227,
241-42.
[Olur system of appellate justice still lodges responsibility for decisions in the
individual judges who compose the tribunal rather than in the court as a bloodless
abstraction. Certainly, where appellate judges are subject to periodic reelection or
reappointment, the data for appraising an incumbent's worth come from his
recorded votes and opinions. As for judges who hold lifetime tenure, the
publication of dissents and separate opinions is a safeguard against arbitrary or
slipshod decision making by fellow judges.
Id.
86. See Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It Due: The Law and Norms of
Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49, 61-62 (2006) (writing that identification of authors creates the
necessary link between that person and his claims, imparting both credit and responsibility).
87. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Witing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REv. 133,
139 (1990). Judge Ginsburg went on to state, "Public accountability through the disclosure
of votes and opinion authors puts the judge's conscience and reputation on the line." Id at
140 (citing Kelman, supra note 85, at 241); see LASSER, supa note 70, at 312-13 (citing
Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and ConstrahntithAdjudication: A CriticalPhenomenology,36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 518, 528-30 (1986)) (suggesting that judges' reputations may be affected by
their attributed opinions).
88. Kelsh, supra note 79, at 145-46 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William
Johnson, supra note 81, quotedin MORGAN, supranote 81, at 169).
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convenient for the lazy, the modest, & the incompetent."" Similarly,
Justice Antonin Scalia has commented that public acknowledgement
of authorship and votes ensures that, due to the risk of embarrassment
or reproach, judges do not drift in their elucidation and application of
Justice Scalia also
legal theories without strong justification."
encouraged composing separate opinions as a means of ensuring
methodical decision making and consistent application of the law."
Accordingly, the individualized method of delivering appellate
decisions promotes sound, well-reasoned opinions and provides the
transparency that is fundamental to the credibility of the courts and to
the accountability of their individual members.92
This accountability is critical for Article III judges, whose
lifetime tenure means not having to worry about losing their judicial
positions over a controversial decision. No matter how much the
public may disagree with a judge's decision, if the judge has not
committed an offense serious enough to warrant impeachment, his or
her tenure is assured." Nevertheless, when judges sign opinions, they
publicly take responsibility for the opinions' contents and
consequences.94 This work product and its attendant reputational effect
are the only means, other than impeachment, to hold unelected judges
accountable." Judges are likely to care about reputation in part
89. Id.
90. Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SuR CT. HIST. 33, 42 ("Even if
they do not personally write the majority or the dissent, their name will be subscribed to the
one view or the other. They cannot, without risk of public embarrassment, meander back and
forth-today providing the fifth vote for a disposition that rests upon one theory of law, and
tomorrow providing the fifth vote for a disposition that presumes the opposite.").
91. Id.
92. See LASSER, supra note 70, at 302 ("[T]he American system is the only one that
presents individually signed judicial decisions, discloses the votes of the sitting judicial
panels, and/or offers the publication of concurring and dissenting opinions. It ... offers
direct access to the arguments and reasoning of the individual judges sitting in judgment on
particular disputes."); Fisk, supra note 86, at 73 (noting that transparency motivates people to
conform their conduct to accepted norms in order to avoid blame, as well as to receive credit).
93. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour .... "); see, eg., Peter M. Shane, Who May
DisciplineorRemove FederalJudges? A ConstitutionalAnalysis,142 U. PA. L. REv 209, 211
(1993) ("[H]istory provides clear evidence that impeachment was to be the sole political
mechanism for disciplining federal judges.").
94. See Ginsburg, supra note 87, at 140. For example, Justice Blackmun was still
targeted by people unhappy with the outcome of Roe v Wade sixteen years after he wrote the
opinion. Id
95. Scalia, supra note 90, at 34 (citing Donald G. Morgan, The Oigin ofSupreme
Court Dissent, 10 WM. & MARY

Q. 353,

354-55 (1953) (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, WORKS

249 (PL. Ford ed., 1905) (relating Jefferson's concern that impeachment and individual
reputation are the only checks on judges))); see Kelman, supra note 85, at 242 ("[R]ecorded
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because of potential promotion9 6 and in part because of a general
reputational incentive.97 This means of accountability depends on
judges signing opinions; those opinions that are issued per curiam
cannot have an impact on the author's public image because the author
remains anonymous.
Accountability is especially critical for the Supreme Court, which
has the ultimate voice in interpreting the Constitution." Not only do
Supreme Court decisions have implications for the parties involved,
but they also dictate the way lower courts approach similar situations
in the future. Likewise, decisions in state appellate courts and federal
courts of appeals should be attributed, as these courts are also often de
facto courts of last resort for a litigant." Because these decisions
significantly influence the outcome of litigation and clarity of the law,
attribution is pivotal to ensure accountability throughout the judicial
decision-making process.
B.

The PerCuaamFrustratesAccountability

Per curiam opinions, by their very nature, obscure the author of
an opinion and therefore frustrate the method of achieving

... opinions ... safeguard against arbitrary or slipshod decision[s] ... by [tenured] judges.").

Judicial attribution creates a situation that is similar to both scholarly attribution and
trademark. See Fisk, supra note 86, at 61-62 (discussing the connection between the quality
of work and reputational effects); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, TrademarkLaw:
An Economic Perspective,30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269-70 (1987) (describing how trademarks
encourage investments in quality).
96. See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants
ofJudicialBehavior,68 U. CIN. L. REv. 615, 631-32 (2000) (suggesting that, while Supreme
Court Justices may not be concerned with promotion, appellate judges may have Supreme
Court ambitions).
97. Id at 629-30.
98. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution . . .."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (establishing the principle ofjudicial review).
99. See Douglas A. Berman & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, In Defense of Less Precedential
Opinions: A Reply to Chief fudge Martin, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2025, 2029 (1999) ("Although
the Supreme Court's decisions garner most of the attention from the media and the academy,
most of the legal developments within the federal judiciary ... occur not at the Supreme
Court but within the courts of appeals."); Victor Eugene Flango, State Supreme Court
Opinions as Law Development, 11 J.AP. PRAC. & PROCESS 105, 106-07 (2010) (noting that
not only do state courts of last resort interpret state law, but also that they "fill the
constitutional gaps" in federal law (quoting William J.Brennan, Jr., The Bill ofRights and the
States: The Revival of State Constitutionsas Guardiansof IndividualRights, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 535, 549 (1986))). For a discussion of the additional accountability implications for
elected judges, see infra Part III.C.
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accountability through attribution.'" When courts use an anonymous
veil, they lose the benefits of the signed opinion-the environment of
transparency, individual responsibility, and well-reasoned explanation-that keep the judiciary credible and accountable.'o Further,
because attribution is the norm, decisions issued per curiam may harm
the courts' credibility if the public believes it is a tactic used for
strategic or political reasons or to maintain secrecy.10 Any impression
that courts are shirking their responsibilities or masking their true
motives may weaken their legitimacy as apolitical and independent
decision makers.o3
Two prominent opinions from the Supreme Court-Bush v Gore
and Buckley v Valeo-illustrate these potential pitfalls in the per
curiam's usage."
Coming at the end of the legal and political
wrangling surrounding the Florida vote recount after the 2000
presidential election, the Bush v Gore decision is perhaps the best
known per curiam opinion in the history of the Court. The decision
determined the winner of the election and therefore made the Court

100. See Marin K. Levy et al., The Costs ofludging Judges by the Numbers, 28 YALE
L. & Pol'Y REv. 313, 317 (2010) ("Because, as their designation suggests, per curiam
opinions are the opinions 'by the court,' they are not signed by the principal drafter .... In
short, there is no way to know which judge should receive credit for the effort of writing these
opinions."); see also TEXAS WATCH, IN THE SHADOWS: A LOOK INTO THE TEXAS SUPREME
COURT'S OVERUSE OF ANONYMOUS OPINIONS 2 (May 2008), available at http://www.aba

journal.com/files/PerCuriamReportFinal.pdf (decrying the Texas Supreme Court's excessive
use of the per curiam as avoiding accountability and the incentive to reach proper legal
conclusions).
101. See Ginsburg, supra note 87, at 140 ("There is security in anonymity .... But
the judge who works under an anonymity cloak 'has nothing like the prominence of the
common law judge.' Judges nameless to the public who write stylized judgments do not
command the moral force judges in the United States sometimes demonstrate." (quoting EH.
LAWSON ET AL., AMOS AND WALTON'S INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 9 (3d ed. 1967)));

Tobias Weiss, Commentary, Judicial Independence: Another Viewpoint, FED. LAW., Aug.
1999, at 39, 39 (denouncing the use of "ukase" per curiams as reducing accountability and
tarnishing the courts' image).
102. See Robbins, supra note 75, at 30 (writing that internal Supreme Court rules
should be published, because "clarity and directness are essential for development of the law,
for understanding of the judicial process, and for respect for the legal system itself").
103. See JOST, supra note 74, at 345 ("[T]he public also tends to view the Court with a
kind of reverence-trusting the Court to be above politics and relying on it to protect
individual freedom and to prevent abuses by Congress, the president, or the states.");
Brennan, supra note 72, at 434 (agreeing with Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes that the
independent character of the Justices is what sustains the Court's public confidence (citing
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS, AN INTERPRETATION 67-68 (1928))).

ITS FOUNDATION,

104. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (per curiam).
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susceptible to accusations of partisanship and politicization."os
Although public opinion polls did not reflect a drop in confidence in
the Court after the decision,"o" many commentators have argued that it
tarnished the Court's image.1 o7 Judge Richard Posner believed that
"[t]he majority decision ... damaged the Court's prestige, at least in

the short run."' The damage occurred because the Court never before
had resolved a presidential election and, in the glare of the intense
media attention and public scrutiny that accompanied the momentous
occasion, its members chose anonymity in an attempt to convey
unanimity. This collectivity, however, bore a thin fagade. 09 The four
scathing dissents,"0 and even the concurring opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist,' revealed that the reasoning of the majority decision was
hardly shared by an undivided Court.' 2 Instead, the Court was divided
ideologically, with the conservatives garnering five votes and ruling in
favor of the conservative presidential candidate, placing the Court
firmly in the middle of the political morass, rather than above it."'
Whereas Bush v Gore reveals the danger posed to the credibility
of the courts by using the per curiam to disguise what could be
perceived as dishonest motivations, Buckley v Valeo is illustrative of a
second problem. When no single Justice is individually responsible for
an opinion, its reasoning may be disjointed and incoherent." Buckley

105. LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SUPREME COURT 169
(2006).
106. JOsT, supranote 74, at 349.
107. See id. at xi (observing that., although the Bush v Gore decision "struck many
experts as emblematic of an assertiveness bordering on arrogance," two years later the Court's
decisions seemed to correspond closely with public sentiment).
108. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 175 (2001).
109. See Ray, supra note 13, at 576 ("In Bush v Gore, with the Court unable to
[achieve authentic unanimity), it settled instead on the per curiam as an alternate method of
conveying the institutional unity that the Court clearly lacked.").
110. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (per curiam) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner
of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law."). The other dissents were
penned by Justice Souter, id. at 129, Justice Ginsburg, id at 135, and Justice Breyer, id. at
144.
111. Id.at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
112. See Ray, supra note 13, at 576 (acknowledging that, despite the per curiam label,
followers of the Court understood that the per curiam did not necessarily indicate genuine
unanimity).
113. JOST, supra note 74, at xi.
114. See Allison R. Hayward, The Per Cunam Opinion of Steel: Buckley v. Valeo as
Superprecedent? Clues from Wisconsin and Vermont, 2005-2006 CATO SUP. CT. REv 195,
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is a landmark 138-page campaign finance per curiam that upheld the
Federal Election Campaign Act limits on campaign contributions but
struck down limits on campaign expenditures."' Although the Justices
worked diligently on the opinion for months, sending drafts to each
other and collaborating on some language, the gluing together of
different parts from different authors into one lengthy and fragmented
decision "demonstrate[d] the perils of drafting by committee.""'
Further, the per curiam opinion in Buckley may not have accurately
reflected the diversity of views on the Court regarding campaign
finance."' That the opinion was both incoherent and incomplete raises
the concern that Judge Posner described: "The less that lawyers and
especially other judges regard judicial opinions as authentic
expressions of what the judges think, the less they will rely on judicial
opinions for guidance and authority.""'
A related concern, although not raised directly by Buckley itself,
is that the per curiam's anonymous nature reduces personal
responsibility and leads to opinions of lower quality."' Then-Circuit
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg remarked, "Judges generally do not labor
over unpublished judgments and memoranda, or even published per
curiam opinions, with the same intensity they devote to signed
opinions."'20 Other judges have also acknowledged spending less time
crafting or editing per curiam decisions, 2' undoubtedly because they
would not be held solely responsible for either the prose or the
ramifications of the opinion.

206 (suggesting that the assignment of various portions of the Buckley opinion to different
Justices' chambers may have generated the opinion's "incoherence").
115. Richard L. Hasen, The UntoldDrafingHistoryof Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION
L.J. 241, 241 (2003).
116. Id. at 251 (noting that the Justices in Buckley "accommodated one another" as an
attempt to appear united).
117. Idat250.
118. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 148
(1999).
119. See JOYCE J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK 325 (5th ed. 2007)
("Per curiam opinions written for .. . convenience-of-the-court reasons ... usually reduce the
expenditure of judge-time, but they also have a tendency to reduce personal responsibility.
This may result in a mediocre or below-average work product.").
120. Ginsburg, supra note 87, at 139. Judge Ginsburg continued, "As a bright
commentator observed in a related context: 'When anonymity of pronouncement is
combined with security in office, it is all too easy for the politically insulated officials to
lapse into arrogant ipse didits'" Id (quoting Kelman, supra note 85, at 242).
121. Eg., Donald L. Burnett, Jr., Law Clerking: 'My Favorite Year, 'ADvOC. (IDAHO
ST. B.), Mar.-Apr. 2010, at 26,28.
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Although one judge has called this concern "[r]ubbish,"l 22 the
admissions of other members of the bench suggest its validity.'23 Judge
Posner agrees that the signed opinion elicits the greatest effort from
judges and "mak[es] the threat of searing professional criticism an
effective check on irresponsible judicial actions.", 24 Nevertheless,
many judges assign drafting of signed opinions to their clerks.125
While a judge whose name appears on an opinion will suffer the
consequences of having his clerks do the majority of the opinion
writing without substantial oversight, a judge who is responsible for an
opinion that is issued per curiam does not have the same degree of
reputational concern. The per curiam, with its veil of anonymity,
diminishes the consequences for judges who fail to do enough of their
own work.'26
Despite these problems with the per curiam, some argue that
circumstances occasionally require a unanimous opinion that is
distanced from any individual author.'27 This argument generally is
premised on a fear that when a court appears divided, it loses
legitimacy.'28 But the authority of a court in a democracy originates in
a grant from the people.'29 Because a majority is sufficient for a grant
of power from the people to the government, the support of only a
majority of a court should be sufficient for an opinion to prevail. 30
Simultaneously, when each judge reduces his or her thinking to
writing, this ensures active dialogue and participation, and thus the
122. Nygaard, suprm note 80, at 49 ("The responsibility for the content of each opinion
rests with the court. . . . [T]he per curiam would inspire greater institutional responsibility.
Judges would read opinions with greater care and perform more editorial surgery, because
opinions could no longer be explained as that of 'SO-AND-SO, Circuit Judge."').
123. Eg., Ginsburg,supra note 87, at 139-40; Scalia, supranote 90, at 42.
124. POSNER, supmnote 118, at 349.
125. Adam Liptak, Justices Long on Words but Short on Guidance,N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2010, at Al ("[T]he available evidence suggests [that Justices] rely on their clerks to
produce first drafts, which the [J]ustices then edit.").
126. See Ginsburg,supra note 87, at 139 ("[U]nsigned work products, more often than
signed opinions, are fully composed by hands other than a judge's own-by staff attorneys or
law clerks-and let out with scant editing by the supervising panel.").
127. See, e.g., Jacobson, supm note 17, at 194 (arguing that controversies concerning
the judiciary's role should be issued per curiam in order to distance them from any individual
judge); cf KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 26
(1960) ("[T]he effort is to make this opinion an opinion of the court .... This, like the
process of consultation and vote, goes some distance to smooth the unevenness of individual
temper and training into a moving average more predictable than the decisions of diverse
single judges.").
128. See infm notes 145-166 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments in

favor of the per curiam).
129. Scalia, supra note 90, at 35.
130. Id.
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vitality of the judiciary."' According to Justice Brennan, explaining
one's views in a dissent "is not self-indulgence-it is very hard work
that we cannot shirk."3 2 Discouraging the use of dissents potentially
leads to the exclusion of important arguments from the written record.
These arguments, when preserved, may become the foundation of
future decisions.'
Disagreement among judges should be expected-and even
welcomed-when strong and independent minds meet on the bench.
When judges are not in accord, their disagreements and jurisprudential
convictions should not be stifled by faux unanimity.3 Although
dissonance on the courts "destroy[s] the illusion of absolute certainty
and of judicial infallibility," according to former New York Court of
Appeals Judge Stanley Fuld, "the reputation and prestige of a court
the influence and weight that it commands-depend on something
stronger and more substantial than an illusion."'
Early in his tenure, Chief Justice John Roberts expressed his
desire to achieve greater genuine unanimity on the Supreme Court.'36
The Roberts Court has had mixed results in meeting this goal,
however, with the percentage of its opinions delivered unanimously
fluctuating from a low of thirty percent of all opinions in 2007, to a
high of forty-eight percent in 2010.11
This quest for genuine
unanimity, however, has resulted in the "artificial unanimity" that
Judge Fuld warned against.' In the 2010 Term, there was at least one
concurring opinion in fifty-three percent of these unanimous
decisions, revealing disagreement in a Court trying to appear
undivided.'39 Perhaps more troubling, unanimous Supreme Court
4

131. Brennan, supra note 72, at 438; see Martha J.Dragich, Will the FederalCourts of
Appeals Pensh If They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions To Explain and
Justify JudicialDecisions Pose a Greater Threat, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 757, 758-59 (1995)
(noting the importance of published opinions in legitimating judicial decisions).
132. Brennan, supra note 72, at 438.
133. For a discussion of the practice of spotting ancillary statements from past
decisions, see mfra Part IVB (examining how judges may plant "time bombs" in their
opinions to resurrect in later cases).
134. See Brennan, supranote 72, at 434 (.'[U]nanimity which is merely formal, which
is recorded at the expense of strong, conflicting views, is not desirable in a court of last resort,
whatever may be the effect upon public opinion at the time (the case is announced]."'
(quoting HUGHES, supranote 103, at 67)).
135. Stanley H. Fuld, The Voices ofDissent,62 COLUM. L. REv 923, 928 (1962).
136.

JEFFREY TOOBrN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT

331 (2007); Liptak, supra note 125.
137. StatPackfor OctoberTerm 2010, supranote 68, at 3.
138. Fuld, supranote 135, at 927.
139. See End-of-Term StatisticalAnalysis-October Term 2010, SCOTUSBLOG, 2
(July 1, 2011), http://wwwscotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/SBSumnary_.Memo
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decisions tend to contain the vaguest rulings, providing the least
guidance to lower courts."' A study that analyzed the language of
Supreme Court opinions using linguistic software maintained that fiveto-four decisions were the clearest, while unanimous opinions were the
most obscure.14 ' It follows, then, that disagreement on the bench
encourages judges to refine their thinking, creating careful opinions
that strengthen the credibility of the judiciary.'42 Further, although
signed and separate opinions fall short of Jefferson's ideal of seiatin
opinions,' this "disagreement among judges is as true to the character
of democracy, and as vital, as freedom of speech itself."'44 It is integral
to maintaining the accountability and credibility of the judiciary.
Commentators have argued that per curiam opinions also may be
desirable in situations in which it is essential for the Court to speak
with one voice.'4 5 Though historic constitutional questions of farreaching significance and public discord are rare, commentators point
to these "constitutional moments when the Court's need for unanimity
may take precedence over an individual Justice's disagreement."4 6 One
prominent example is the post-Brown v Board of Education47
desegregation cases, in which the Supreme Court
buil[t] a bridge of per curiams, each one presented as following
inevitably from its predecessor, until the final conclusion was, as the
Court insisted, irrefutable. The strategic advantages of this approach are
obvious. It would hardly have assisted the painful struggle to
implement Brown throughout the South if each new case provided a
new occasion to revisit old discredited arguments and reopen old
wounds. By eliminating legal discussion and allowing the per curiam
form to carry its message of unstoppable progress, the Court
OTIO.pdf, Liptak, supra note 125 (indicating that, in the 2009 Term, there was at least one
concurring opinion in seventy-seven percent of the decisions).
140. Liptak, supra note 125.
141. Id. (citing Ryan J. Owens & Justin Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity:
Analyzing the Complexity of Supreme Court Opinions(June 16, 2010) (manuscript at 22),
availableathttp://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1695775).
142. See Robert G. Flanders, Jr., The Utility of Separate Judicial Opinions in
Appellate Courts ofLastResort: Why DissentsAre Valuable, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv.
401, 408 (1999) (writing that decisions with separate opinions reflect that "these decisions
are the product of independent and reflective thought and that they emanate from judges who,
though they try to persuade one another about how a case should be resolved, do not simply
acquiesce in the majority's point of view to serve the interests of 'monolithic solidarity"').
143. See supranote 82 and accompanying text.
144. Fuld, supr note 135, at 926.
145. See GEORGE, supra note 119, at 325; Laura Krugman Ray, Judging the Justices:
A Supreme CourtPerformanceReview, 76 TEMP. L. Ruv. 209, 212-13 (2003).
146. Ray, supra note 145, at 212.
147. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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communicated its constitutional position more effectively and less
provocatively than a sequence of fully developed opinions could have

done.148
According to the commentators, the cases compel a unanimous
opinion in order to emphasize the Court's authority and the rightness
of its decision.'4 9 While unanimity may best highlight the magnitude
of such decisions, the Court could achieve this end by having each
Justice individually sign, as it did in Cooper v Aaron.'o Following the
Brown cases, the Court grew impatient waiting for the states to comply
with its desegregation order, and by issuing the unanimous opinion
signed by all nine Justices, it forcefully conveyed this message to the
states and to the public."'
Although the per curiam arguably was helpful in enabling the
Court to issue abbreviated opinions without substantial discussion of
its reasoning, it could have issued signed opinions that contained just
as little substance. But the argument that these abbreviated opinions
advanced the Court's objectives also lacks merit, as some commentators question whether the post-Brown train of per curiams was as
effective as the preceding quotation describes.'52 A significant portion
of the Brown opinion was dedicated to addressing the negative effects
of racial segregation in the specific setting of public education.' The
subsequent per curiams, however, neglected to address adequately how
the education-centric rationale in Brown applied to other public
facilities, such as golf courses'54 and beaches.' Indeed, well-known
and respected legal scholars criticized the Court for failing to explain
148. Ray, supra note 13, at 540.
149. Jacobson, supra note 17, at 189, 203 ("Despite the disintegration in our age of the
norm of unanimity, a per curiam designation, in one of its modes, is at least a rhetorical call
for unanimity where a decision implicates the interests of the Court as an institution in a
major issue affecting the frame of governance."); Ray, supranote 145, at 221-22.
150. 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding, in the desegregation context, that the states were
bound by the Supreme Court's decisions, and could not choose to ignore them); see supra
note 35 and accompanying text (setting forth Jacobson's argument that the Pentagon Papers
opinion should have been signed).
151. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term-Foreword: The High
Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time andLaw, 79 HARV. L. REv 56, 63 n.27
(1965) (noting that the importance of some cases is best acknowledged by all of the members
of the Court signing on to the opinion).
152.

See, e.g.,

EVAN GERSTMANN,

THE CONSTITUTIONAL

UNDERCLASS:

GAYS,

LESBIANS, AND THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 33 (1999) (recognizing that

Brown's special emphasis on education made it difficult for the Court to explain why
segregated golf courses and beaches were unconstitutional).
153. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,492-95 (1954).
154. Holmes v. City ofAtlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam).
155. Mayor of Bait. v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam).
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the constitutional reasoning behind desegregation in Brown's "per
curiam progeny," even when those scholars approved of the Court's
holding.'
Some advocates of the per curiam go even further, arguing that
the per curiam is desirable in all opinions issued by appellate courts,
not just in important constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court.'
They point out that the signed opinion is not constitutionally mandated
and that the per curiam is not contradictory to any particularly
venerated Anglo-American judicial tradition, suggesting that the
courts' identity should be derived by the institution and not by the
individuals who comprise it.' Judge Richard Lowell Nygaard of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit writes that the
signed opinion leads to an inherent contradiction between a judge's ego
and the courts' institutional role.' The result is "a deterioration in the
institutional diligence on some courts of appeals, leaving the judge
who is assigned the opinion to write approximately as he or she
pleases as long as the result represents the conference position." 60 He
therefore advocates for the use of the per curiam as a means to inspire
greater institutional responsibility for the content of each opinion,
rejecting the arguments that the individually signed opinion produces
better reasoned decisions and increases personal responsibility."'
By concentrating public scrutiny on the institution rather than on
individuals, the argument goes, courts' independence and accountability would be heightened, not diminished.'62 Advocates of the neutral
156. See GERSTMANN, supra note 152, at 33 (listing prominent scholars who attempted
to recast Brown as a "political-process decision").
157. See Nygaard, supra note 80, at 43 (suggesting that judicial opinions should not be
signed because "[o]pinions are the product of a consensus"); Markham, supm note 78, at 925
(arguing that signed opinions create a situation where "opinions are written less for the
litigants than for an external audience of like-minded devotees").
158. Nygaard, supra note 80, at 43 ("[T]he per curiam opinion does not run counter to
or violate any revered tradition. It is a part of the American heritage from English law.");
Markham, supra note 78, at 926 ("Nothing in the Constitution or any other source of
American law mandates the current practice of identifying the author of each opinion
published in a given case, including majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents.").
159. Nygaard, supra note 80, at 41.
160. Id.at 45.
161. Id.at41.
162. See Markham, supra note 78, at 926.
Having a Justice's name attached to an opinion brings a measure of accountability
and control to an otherwise secretive institution, but this accountability carries with
it a cost in the Court's ability to appear independent and above the political fray,
and detracts from the notion of the Court as something greater than the nine
individuals who comprise it.
Id.
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per curiam argue that it was effective, for instance, in the politically
charged circumstances of Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing
There, the unsigned opinion came not from individual
Board'
Justices with their own political views, but from the Court itself, "an
institution situating itself above politics."" Similarly, the three Justices

who signed Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v
Casey65 moved toward anonymity in an attempt to strengthen the
Court's institutional voice while addressing the sensitive issue of
abortion.'"
This argument aligns with Judge Learned Hand's view that the
institution of the courts is more important than the "individual
'proclivities' of the judges.",6 1 Unanimity, however, "is not in itself a
Judicial accountability is best promoted when
judicial virtue."'"6
disagreement is embraced and potentially far-reaching individual
opinions are not stifled for the sake of false unanimity. Similarly,
anonymity is not meritorious. Instead, when opinions are attributed,
they allow the public to serve as a check on the judiciary and create an
incentive for diligent effort in lawmaking, which in turn reinforces the
courts' role as a reputable and apolitical institution.
C

ElectedJudges, Too, ShouldAvoid Per Cunam Opinons

In thirty-nine states, judges must either run for election or at least
be subject to periodic retention votes.' The public relies on recorded
votes and opinions in evaluating judges who are subject to reelection
or reappointment. Thus, when a court comprised of elected judges
issues a per curiam opinion, it reduces the information available to
voters on which to make their decisions.

163. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam) (vacating and remanding the Florida Supreme
Court decision allowing the recount of votes because that decision lacked an adequate
explanation); see Ray, supranote 13, at 569.
164. Ray, supm note 13, at 569.
165. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (implementing the "undue burden" standard in assessing
state regulation of abortion).
166. Markham, supma note 78, at 937. In that case, however, the existence of three
signatures, while to some extent obscuring the authorship of the opinion, at least indicates to
the public the affirmative support of the Justices who attached their names to the opinion.
167. Nygaard, supra note 80, at 49 (citing LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 71
(1958)).
168. Brennan, supo note 72, at 432.
169. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLTICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000-2009:
DECADE OF CHANGE, at app. 3 (2010), availableat http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/JASNPJE-Decade-ONLINE.pdf.
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While the accountability argument differs somewhat in the
context of elected rather than appointed judges, the result is the
same-judges must be accountable through attribution. Any judge
who must make a politically charged decision may face undesirable
consequences, and elected judges face the further potential
consequence of losing their jobs. Elected judges are subject to the
pressures of any elected official-they must raise money for
campaigns and convince their constituents to vote for them."o When a
court is forced to make a decision on a politically sensitive matter,
judicial elections may mean that the judges on the court become
targets of campaigns against their reelection or retention."'
Recently, three justices of the Iowa Supreme Court were targeted
by such a campaign as a result of their decision in Varnun v Bien, in
which the court struck down a law defining marriage in Iowa as
between a man and a woman.'72 Political groups spent more than
$500,000 during the campaign,'7 even though the vote was only on
whether to retain the justices, and not part of a head-to-head
competition. The threat of elected judges becoming targets of
campaigns against their reelection seems to be increasing with the
elevated spending on judicial election campaigns over the past
decade.'74
One might argue that opinions in controversial cases, such as
arnurn, should be issued per curiam in order to avoid retaliation
through election campaigns by those opposed to a judge's decision or
170. For an overview of the argument that judicial elections violate litigants' due
process rights by distorting the judicial decision-making process, see MONROE H. FREEDMAN
& ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 248-50 (3d ed. 2004).
171. See Ginsburg, supra note 87, at 140 (citing the successful campaign in 1986
against retaining California Chief Justice Rose Bird and Associate Justices Cruz Reynoso and
Joseph Grodin as evidence that judicial elections often reflect popular opinion rather than
judicial performance).
172. 763 N.W2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009).
173. Andy Kopsa, National Anti-Gay Groups Unite To Target Iowa Judges, lOWA
INDEP. (Oct. 21 2010), http://iowaindependent.com/45701/national-anti-gay-groups-unite-totarget-iowa-judges. In general, the 2010 retention votes "marked the rapid politicization of
judicial races that had been specifically designed to be free of intrigue," with spending on
such votes reaching three million dollars as compared with the two million dollars spent in
the last decade. A.G. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges over Marnage Issue, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/l l/03/us/politics/03judges.html?scp=
2&sq=iowa%20judges&st=cse. On the removal of the three Iowa judges, see also Annette J.
Scieszinski & Neal Ellis, The Gamble ofJudging: The 2010 Iowa Supreme Court Retention
Election, JUDGES' J., Fall 2011, at 8; Patricia Timmons-Goodson, An Interview with Justice
MichaelJ Streit(Ret.), JUDGES' J., Fall 2011, at 9.
174. For a description of the increased intensity ofjudicial elections in the past decade,
see SAMPLE ET AL., supranote 169.

2 0121]

PER CURIAM OPINIONS

1223

pattern of decisions. But there are three fundamental flaws in this
argument. First, the decision in Vamurn was unanimous. It would not
have mattered had the justices shielded the identity of the opinion's
author with a per curiam because they had already indicated to the
public that there was complete agreement among the members of the
court. Even if the justices had not been unanimous in a per curiam
opinion, the breakdown of their votes would still have been
determinable, and thus the per curiam would not have prevented
political retaliation. Second, that the other three justices lost the
retention vote, despite not having authored the Varnm opinion,
suggests that apparent agreement with an unpopular ruling is sufficient
to make a judge a political target. Third, arguing for the use of per
curiam in cases announcing politically charged decisions in order to
avoid retaliation conflicts with the fundamental design of the judicial
election process. The reason to elect judges is to allow the public to
voice its approval or disapproval of judges' decisions. On the one
hand, one who favors judicial elections should be offended by the idea
of issuing controversial opinions as per curiam; in so doing, the court
is circumventing the judicial election process by attempting to protect
the author of the opinion from the electorate. On the other hand, one
who opposes judicial elections based on a belief that judicial opinions
are meant to be apolitical does not resolve the matter by suggesting
that controversial decisions should be issued per curiam. As the
aftermath of Vamum illustrates, such a tactic will not always be
sufficient to avoid political reprisal for judges.
The use of unattributed decisions is an ineffective solution to the
problem of the politicization of judicial decision making.' In one
sense, the use of unattributed decisions as a solution is too narrow an
approach because situations like those surrounding Varnun will still
occur. At the same time, this approach is overly broad; it brings with it
all of the negative effects of the per curiam that are discussed above in
this Part. Thus, the argument that elected judges should issue per
curiam opinions in controversial cases to avoid reprisal is not
persuasive.

175. It seems strange to suggest that changing the system of attribution, rather than the
judicial-election system itself, is the solution to the problems that come with such elections.
Prominent jurists and scholars, including Justice O'Connor and Dean Erwin Chemerinsky,
have advocated for reforms to the judicial-election system. James Podgers, O'Connor on
Judicial Elections: "They're Awful I Hate Them," A.B.A. J. (May 9, 2009, 8:09 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/oconnor chemerinsky-sound-wamings atLaba-con
ference about the dangers-of s/.
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IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
Along with providing for individual accountability, the signed
opinion reflects the role of judges and justices as individual
lawmakers. In courts that reach their decisions by majority vote and
express those decisions through the words of a single author, the
individualized nature of the judge cannot be understated. The oft-used
judges-as-umpires analogy may play well during Senate confirmation
hearings; however, it ignores the truth that judges and justices draw
from their own philosophy, worldview, and experiences to determine
where the law stands or what the Constitution means."1 6 This leads to
judges developing their own unique patterns of decision making, just
as no two umpires have identical strike zones. As then-Judge
Benjamin Cardozo wrote in his seminal work, The Nature of the
JudicialProcess,"Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes
and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of
instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the
man, whether he be litigant or judge.""' Conscious and subconscious
forces shape each individual judge, and therefore shape the law as
expressed in judicial opinions.
Like a signed opinion, the per curiam is not written "by the
court'" as its name suggests, but is necessarily written by some
individual judge with a unique philosophy. Each judge also

176. See Bruce Weber, Umpires v Judges, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, at WKl
(recounting the use of the umpire analogy by senators and nominees). When Chief Justice
Roberts was a nominee, he declared at his confirmation hearings that "[j]udges are like
umpires .... Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them. The role of an umpire and a
judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role." Id
(internal quotation marks omitted). Chief Justice Roberts also acknowledged, however, that
"we all bring our life experiences to the bench." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As
Weber wrote, "[T]he umpire metaphor misleadingly jumble[s] together the ideas of belief,
bias and activism, as though all personal viewpoints are somehow tainted for being personal.
Judges with personal beliefs make objective decisions all the time . . . ." Id; see also
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 74 (2007) ("The Constitution's abstract language makes it
impossible for judges to behave like umpires, and every justice has an ideologically
identifiable voting pattern.").
177. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 (1921); see
William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," 10 CARDOZO L.
REv. 3, 10 (1988) ("Sensitivity to one's intuitive and passionate responses, and awareness of
the range of human experience, is ... not only an inevitable but a desirable part of the judicial
process, an aspect more to be nurtured than feared."); Fuld, supra note 135, at 926 (asserting
that it is unreasonable to expect judges with different backgrounds to approach legal issues in
the same manner).
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contributes a unique style." Knowledge of these philosophies and
styles enables both lower courts and attorneys to develop the law and
tailor their arguments effectively. The per curiam label, however,
serves to mask its author's identity and, in doing so, it obscures the
author's jurisprudence, the significance of the decision, and the
decision's potential to affect future cases."' In this way, the per curiam
stunts an appropriate development of the law.
A.

JudicialPersonaities

Individual personalities pervade courts and necessarily influence
Consequently, there is an inherent paradox
judicial decisions.'
between a purportedly voiceless per curiam opinion and the reality that
individual personalities shape the development of the law.
Furthermore, judicial impersonality is not necessarily desirable."'
Judges' recognition of their differences and the importance of
expressing their unique perspectives while engaging in vigorous
debate balances conflicting personalities and philosophies on the

178. See Laura A. Heymann, The Birth oftheAuthomym: Authorship,Pseudonymity
and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1377, 1408 (2005) ("[A] court may issue an
opinion per culiam, without further attribution, even though it is the work of one or more
judges on the panel and may bear the stylistic hallmarks of its author or authors such that
more accurate attribution could be achieved.").
179. See JosT, supra note 74, at 505-06 ("The written opinions often affect national
policy on major social and economic issues. They are read with close attention by judges,
attorneys, lobbyists, news reporters, and policymakers."); Richard B. Cappalli, Improving
Appellate Opinions,83 JUDICATURE 286, 286 (2000) ("The written judicial opinion is critical
to legal systems like that of the United States in which decisions of judges and their
justifications constitute law that will control the result when comparable controversies appear
again in court.").
180. See CARDOZO, supra note 177, at 169 (articulating that the myth of pure judicial
impersonality is an "ideal ... beyond the reach of human faculties to attain"); cf Brennan,
supm note 72, at 432 ("The Court is something of a paradox-it is at once the whole and its
constituent parts. The very words 'the Court' mean simultaneously the entity and its
members.").
181. Brennan, supra note 177, at 10. But see Amy Goldstein et al., Sotomayor
Emphasizes Objectivity Explains 'Wise Latina' Remark, WASH. POST (July 15, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/14/AR2009071400992.html
(noting that Justice Sotomayor faced heavy criticism during her Supreme Court nomination
hearings for her previous remarks regarding the influence of life experiences on judicial
decision making). Although Justice Sotomayor distanced herself from the controversial
"wise Latina" comment, she has recognized the existence and potential influence of a judge's
life experiences on judicial decisions, but has urged judges to "seek to transcend their
identities" by working together to find common ground. SeeCharlie Savage, A Judget View
of fudging Is on the Recoro N.Y TIMES, May 15, 2009, at A21 (referring to then-Judge
Sotomayor's foreword in the 2007 book, The InternationalJudge).
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bench. 8 2 Attributed and separate opinions highlight the individual role
of judges on a court and "make[] it clear that ... decisions are the
product of independent and thoughtful minds, who try to persuade one
another but do not simply 'go along' for some supposed 'good of the
institution."""
An individual's upbringing, experiences, and prejudices shape
one's personality. This personality in turn naturally influences one's
worldview, political inclinations, and jurisprudence.'84 This influence
is manifested in judicial opinions. A clear example of the impact of
personality and experience on a judicial opinion is Justice Stevens's
dissent in Texas v Johnson, in which he argued that flag burning
should not be constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.'
This dissent was "the most out-of-character vote of his judicial
career,"'86 but is understandable considering his military service in
Justice Stevens
World War II and his son's service in Vietnam.'
himself acknowledged that his time in the Navy affected his feelings
about flag burning, noting, "I don't think anybody can go through a
war and not have it have a profound effect on him."' Clerks and
secretaries who were present recalled the intense emotion that gripped
Justice Stevens-his red face, raw voice, and teary eyes-as he read
182. See CARDOZO, supra note 177, at 177 ("The eccentricities of judges balance one
another. One judge looks at problems from the point of view of history, another from that of
philosophy, another from that of social utility, one is a formalist, another a latitudinarian, one
is timorous of change, another dissatisfied with the present; out of the attrition of diverse
minds there is beaten something which has a constancy and uniformity and average value
greater than its component elements.").
183. Scalia, supm note 90, at 35. Justice Scalia also has acknowledged that personally
signed opinions put the Court at the forefront of legal development. Id at 39.
184. Jeffrey Rosen discusses the role of various Justices' childhoods, personalities, and
experiences in their jurisprudence throughout the history of the Court. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE
SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA (2007). Rosen
describes, for example, the influence that service in the Union Army during the Civil War had
on Justices John Harlan and Oliver Wendell Holmes. Id. at 80, 83-86. Justice Harlan
transformed from a Southern slaveholder to vocal advocate of racial and economic equality
after witnessing the battlefield bravery and sacrifices of black troops. Id Justice Holmes, by
contrast, was disgusted by the bloody camage of a conflict enflamed by unbending
ideologies; although he was the son of a Massachusetts abolitionist, he became a "radical
skeptic of abolitionism and of all constitutional ideals." Id.
185. 491 U.S. 397, 436-39 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. ToOnIN, supra note 136, at 234.
187. BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT
LIFE 14 (2010) (quoting one of Justice Stevens's law clerks, who called the dissent
"biographical" and "very much based on his experience").
188. Jeffrey Cole & Elaine E. Bucklo, A Life Well Lived: An Interview with Justice
John Paul Stevens, LITIG., Spring 2006, at 8, 8-9. Justice Stevens went on to say that he still
believed he was "dead right" in his dissent. Id.at 9.
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his dissent from the bench.' To Justice Stevens, the American flag is
sacred and deserves protection from "unnecessary desecration."'90 It is
symbolic of ideals worth fighting for, ones "of freedom, of equal
opportunity, of religious tolerance, and of good will for other peoples
who share our aspirations.""' Justice Stevens personally fought for
those ideals, and he undoubtedly had friends who died while doing the
same. Thus, he could not decide the issue differently.
In the same case, Justices Kennedy and Scalia acknowledged
their personal beliefs, yet still were able to create an air of neutrality.
They concurred with the majority in Texas v Johnson and found a
prohibition on flag burning unconstitutional "despite their deeply held
reverence for traditional values."'92 As Justice Kennedy wrote: "The
hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like.
We make them because they are right, right in the sense that the law
and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result."' By noting
their beliefs while claiming to subordinate them to the demands of the
Constitution, Justices Kennedy and Scalia suggested that impersonality is not necessary to achieve an unbiased decision.'94
In reaching a decision, judges may be able to remain unbiased
while reflecting on their own beliefs and worldview. Pressure to
eschew personality for the appearance of impartiality and institutional
cohesiveness is misguided.'" Per curiam opinions, in which the
institution itself is the attributed author, are a manifestation of this
pressure; they give credit to an author who appears to have no
189. BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supranote 187, at 18.
190. Johnson,491 U.S. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Id.at 437.
192. WRIGHTSMAN, supr note 105, at 22.
193. Johnson,491 U.S. at 420-21 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
194. Cf Laura Krugman Ray, JudicialPetsonality: Rhetoric andEmotion in Supreme
Court Opinions,59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 233-34 (2002) (referencing Justice Cardozo's
belief by stating that "there is no way to extinguish the personal identity of a judge and leave
behind only a dispassionate professional decisionmaker").
195. Chief Justice Roberts has said that he wants the legacy of his Court to be one in
which individual Justices "subordinate their own interests and agendas in the interest of
building judicial consensus and institutional legitimacy," and even pointed to the ritual and
dress of the Court as evidence of its impartiality. ROSEN, supra note 184, at 234, 239-40. At
the same time, it appears that the Justices' political views are becoming increasingly open to
the public. See Dahlia Lithwick, Their Own Pivate Hell: Will the Supreme Courth
Evolving View ofPnvacy Undermine the FirstAmendment?, SLATE (Mar. 8, 2011,6:09 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2287234 (noting recent examples of Justices giving speeches at
political events and joking that, "[i]f the gotcha videos and the accusations and
counteraccusations continue to fly, by the time the court finally gets the case about the
constitutionality of President Obama's health care law, the only people who will be allowed to
hear it will be two law clerks and the guy who works in the mailroom").
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personality. In reality, individual personalities pervade the substance
and language of a per curiam just as they do in signed opinions
without sacrificing impartiality. As a result, per curiams are
unnecessary to avoid bias in judicial decision making.
B. Individualityand the Language ofludicialDecisions
Judicial opinions are personalized not only in the legal positions
they adopt, but also in the style and content of the language used to
express those positions. Whether the opinion is written by multiple
judges or is an unattributed per curiam, the opinion reflects an
individual style without revealing its author."' Justices Brennan and
Cardozo both believed that "impersonality is not possible and that
judges inevitably infuse their work with elements of their own
distinctive natures."'97 For this reason, the opinions of certain judges
are instantly recognizable, with a style that conveys to the public a
sense of the judge and his judicial philosophy.'98 While individual style
and voice can be distinguishable, the majority of the legal community
and the public would not be able to match the language of an opinion
to a particular author, making it more essential that opinions be
attributed.
Scholars have explored how the writing styles of various Justices
serve as windows into their temperaments and jurisprudence." Justice
Black, for example, made his opinions accessible by writing in a
conversational manner, with the objective of enabling the public to
understand its constitutional protections, which he considered to be
only those expressly authorized by constitutional language.2 Justice
196. See supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text (explaining that Buckley
demonstrates the difficulties of writing by committee due to the distinct styles of its various
authors).
197. Ray, supranote 194, at 194 (citing Brennan, supm note 177, at 3).
198. POSNER, supra note 118, at 145; see Ray, supra note 145, at 217 ("In the golden
age when Justices wrote for themselves, many of them developed distinctive voices that the
reader could recognize immediately. And those recognizable voices created strong judicial
personalities that also told us something about the Justice's jurisprudence."). Judge Posner
also believes, however, that
[t]he strongly marked individuality that traditionally characterized English and American
judges and that makes the opinions of a Holmes, a Cardozo, or a Learned Hand instantly
recognizable as their author's personal work is becoming a thing of the past. The result
is not just a loss of flavor but a loss of information.
POSNER, supra note 118, at 145.

199. See generally Ray, supra note 194, at 193-94 (chronicling the relationship
between various Justices' writing and experiences).
200. Id at 198-201.
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Frankfurter's decisions, by contrast, were written in the formal and
abstract language of an intellectual. He had been a Harvard Law
School professor before he came to the Court; his themes of judicial
restraint and deference to democratic will were addressed to a
particular and select class of society.2 0 On today's Court, Justice
Scalia's voice is readily recognizable through his matter-of-fact style of
writing, which often conveys his impatience by challenging the
foolishness of his colleagues.202 His voice is "a carefully constructed
artifice, the persona that conveys emotional reactions as well as legal
arguments."20 These are examples not only of unique styles of judicial
writing; they are also illustrations of unique methods of judicial
decision making, which the Justices convey to the public through their
opinions. By reading a decision written by Justice Black, an advocate
would know to avoid the lofty ideological arguments and flowery
language that appealed to Justice Frankfurter. A more accessible
argument, appealing to a seemingly commonsense or straightforward
reading of the Constitution, was more likely to sway Justice Black, just
as it is more likely to convince Justice Scalia today.
Judges also express their individual views and personality by
using particular words in the articulation of legal standards. These
words, of course, have immense implications for the law, as lower
courts, lawyers, and the public attempt to determine what exactly the
law "is" based on a higher court's language.20 As one commentator
has noted, "[W]hen a court explains its decision in a judicial opinion,
literally every word has a potential future effect on someone's
welfare."205 Given their effect on the law and the outcome of future
cases, words in judicial opinions should be-and often are-chosen
with an eye carefully attuned to potential implications. The desirability
of these implications, and thus the use of a particular word or phrase,
depends on the author's personal view of where the law stands and the
direction in which it ought to move.206

201. Id.at 201-04.
202. Id. at 226-27.
203. Id at 227.
204. See Cappalli,supra note 179, at 287 ("Rules are constructed of words, and words
are imperfect expressions of thought. This is particularly true of the abstract words used in
law.... From the moment of publication the judicial opinion, and every word within,
becomes an instrument for good or evil in the hands of lawyers and judges.").
205. Id.
206. These personal views on the law are necessarily determined and shaped by the
judges' individual personality. See supm Part IVA.
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At times, Justices will openly advocate for a favored word or
phrase to be adopted as the legal standard. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, for example, developed a reputation for her unique views
on abortion.207 In her first important abortion-related case, Akron v
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., Justice O'Connor
dissented from the majority opinion and promoted an "undue burden"
test as the appropriate inquiry into whether the challenged regulation
infringed upon a woman's constitutional rights.208 Nine years later, the
209
abortion question was again before the Court in Casey.
Conservatives on the bench had four votes to overturn Roe v Wade210 and to
allow states wide latitude in regulating abortion.21' Justice O'Connor,
however, had reservations and wanted to uphold the "essence" of Roe
while allowing most of the challenged restrictive provisions to stand.212
She ultimately joined with Justices Souter and Kennedy to draft the
majority opinion, stating, "In our view, the undue burden standard is
the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the
woman's constitutionally protected liberty."2 3 Justice O'Connor's
singular take on abortion, represented by the phrase "undue burden,"
had triumphed and "[a] stray observation from a separate opinion ...
had become the law of the land on the most contentious constitutional
issue of her time."214
In other instances, judges and justices are more discreet about the
use of words and phrases they intend or hope will affect the law in a
desired manner. Justice Brennan, in particular, was known for
inserting apparently nonprovocative language into the text or footnote
of an opinion, only to draw on that language to advance his position in
a later case.215 He did so strategically, knowing how far his colleagues
were willing to go and "crafting legal arguments to which they could,
however hesitantly, sign on."216 Although these decisions may not have
207. TooBIN, supo note 136, at 50.
208. 462 U.S. 416, 463-64 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The 'undue burden'
required in the abortion cases represents the required threshold inquiry that must be
conducted before this Court can require a State to justify its legislative actions under the
exacting 'compelling state interest' standard.").
209. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
210. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
211. TOOBIN, supmnote 136, at 47.
212. See id. at 52 (recounting that Justice O'Connor was especially bothered by a
provision that required married women seeking abortions to inform their husbands, seeing it
"as paternalism at best and sexism at worst").
213. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
214. TOOBIN, supmnote 136, at 58.
215. STERN &WERMIEL, supra note 55, at 343.
216. Ruth Marcus, The CourtkLiberalChampion,WASH. POsT, Oct. 6, 2010, at Al9.

2012]

PER CURIAM OPINIONS

1231

fully conformed to Justice Brennan's personal point of view, he was
willing to compromise-to draft the opinion in a manner that would
allow him to advance his entire vision later and to wait patiently for the
appropriate case in which to do so. 2 7 Justice Brennan's practice has
not gone unnoticed: his biographers wrote that his "colleagues learned
to watch for the seemingly innocuous casual statement or footnoteseeds that would be exploited to their logical extreme in a later case.""
One such seed may have been planted in the well-known and oftcited contraception case, Eisenstadt v Bard2 91 Due to the diversity of
the views on the Court following oral arguments and conference,
Justice Brennan initially agreed to compose a brief per curiam opinion
and dispose of the case quickly.220 The draft that he circulated,
however, was a sixteen-page signed opinion addressing the merits of
the case.22' Justice Brennan presented this draft to his colleagues on
the morning of December 13, 1971, the very day that Roe was first
argued before the Court.222 He included in the draft a phrase that
would become famous: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the &ndividual,married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."22 3
This language, which was not suggested by any argument, brief, or
amici curiae, "linked contraception and abortion as part of the overall
phenomenon of human reproduction."224 In doing so, Justice Brennan
may have been attempting to influence the outcome of the abortion
decisions. 225 This possibility is reinforced by the fact that, when Justice
William Douglas approached Justice Brennan regarding the latter's
views on Justice Douglas's proposed opinion for Doe v Boltod 26 -the
companion case to Roe-Justice Brennan noted that "Eisenstadtin its
1

2 17. Id
218. STERN & WERMIEL, supranote 55, at 343. "O'Connor had taken to heart Powell's
warnings that Brennan planted 'time bombs' in his opinions. She had learned to watch for
those seemingly offhand, throwaway phrases that he exploited in later cases." Id. at 493.
219. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
220. Roy Lucas, NewHistoicalInsightson the Cuious Caseof Baird v. Eisenstadt, 9
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 9, 13,42 (2003).
221. Id.at43.
222. Id
223. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 453; Lucas, supra note 220, at 43.
224. Lucas, supra note 220, at 43.
225. See STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 55, at 370 (stating that rather than issue a
narrow opinion, Justice Brennan used Eisenstadtas a way to expand the right of privacy);
Lucas, supra note 220, at 14.
226. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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discussion of Giswold is helpful in addressing the abortion

question."227

Justice Brennan may well have planted a second seed in a case
involving a constitutional issue no less important than privacy rights
and reproduction: freedom of speech under the First Amendment.
Brandenburgv Ohid28 allowed the Court to reconsider its free speech
jurisprudence outside of the politically charged Cold War context, in
which it had widely deferred to government regulation.229 At
conference, the Justices unanimously agreed to overturn
Brandenburg's conviction for making racist, anti-Semitic, and
antigovernment statements at a Ku Klux Klan rally.230 Chief Justice
Warren assigned the opinion to Justice Abe Fortas, who had a
burgeoning reputation in First Amendment cases.' After circulating
his draft opinion, however, Justice Fortas was forced to leave the Court
for financial improprieties.232 Justice Brennan assumed the task of
completing the opinion, which was issued as a per curiam after Justice
Fortas's departure.233
Although Justice Brennan agreed generally with Justice Fortas's
position,234 his redrafted opinion subtly but significantly changed
Brandenburg's standard for the constitutional regulation of speech.2
Justice Fortas's draft "would have virtually returned the law to the clear
and present danger test" and the view that "speech might not 'be
227. STERN& WERMIEL, supm note 55, at 370 (emphasis added).
228. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
229. See Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigmand OtherFstAmendments, 12
U. PA. J.CONST. L. 971, 975-76 (2010) (explaining that the Court took fifty years to "officially
embrace either the spirit or the full measure of protections" in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes'
"clear and present danger" test, and that from the 1930s to the McCarthy era the Court
allowed the government to regulate political speech, especially for alleged communists).
230. See Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 445-46 (recounting that Brandenburg had been
filmed making derogatory statements about Jews and blacks at a Ku Klux Klan rally and also
spoke about taking "revengeance" against the U.S. government if it "continue[d] to suppress
the white, Caucasian race"). Brandenburg was convicted under an Ohio statute for
"advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform and for
voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or
advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Id at 444-45 (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
231. Schwartz, supo note 54, at 27.
232. Gey, supm note 229, at 977; Schwartz, supm note 54, at 28.
233. Schwartz, supa note 54, at 28.
234. See id. ("After he had read the Fortas draft, Brennan wrote, on April 15, 1969,
'Of course I am with you in this. It's a splendid opinion."'). In his memo to Justice Fortas
regarding the draft opinion, Justice Brennan also suggested various alterations in the
language, which Justice Fortas partially incorporated into his draft. Id
235. Id.
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punished except upon a showing of clear and present danger of
imminent, substantial, criminal, or violent consequences."'236 Justice
Brennan's ultimate opinion, however, removed positive references to
the clear and present danger test and substituted for Justice Fortas's
requirement of "inciting ... imminent lawless action" the phrase

"likely to incite or produce such [lawless] action."237 These two
alterations created a Brandenburg standard that is much more
protective of potentially subversive speech.238 Professor Bernard
Schwartz summarized Justice Brennan's role in Brandenburgand its
effect on the law as follows:
By changing a few words in the Fortas draft, Brennan completely
altered the cast of the Brandenburgopinion. So far as is known, none
of the other justices had any comment on Brennan's changes; perhaps
they did not even realize what he had done in the seemingly slight
alterations he made. What is clear is that the whole Court joined [in]
the Brandenburgper curiam ....
Justice Brennan was the most prolific-or at least the best
known-composer and exploiter of seemingly innocuous language.
But he was not alone among Supreme Court Justices. Commentators
today, for example, are looking to an aside by Justice Ginsburg in
CluistianLegal Society Chapterv Martinez24 0 for clues about how the
Court will rule in future cases involving gay marriage.2 41 In her
majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg wrote that the Court's decisions
"have declined to distinguish between status and conduct" in the
context of laws affecting gays and lesbians.2 42 This brief phrase is
potentially significant because "courts are more apt to protect groups

236. Id.at 27-28.
237. Id at 28 ("The crucial element in Brennan's redraft was, as Judge Posner points
out, 'the addition of the words "likely to incite;' because "likely to" implies that "incite" has
the force of "bring about" rather than [merely] "try to stir up.""' (alteration in original)
(quoting Richard A. Posner, The Leared Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial
Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511, 515 (1994) (reviewing GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND:
THE MAN ANDTHE JUDGE (1994))).
238. Id.
239. Id.at 29.
240. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (holding that a law school policy requiring officially
recognized student groups to comply with a nondiscrimination policy did not violate the
organization's rights to free speech, expressive association, and exercise of religion).
241. Adam Liptak, Looking for Time Bombs and Tea Leaves on Gay Marriage,N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 2010, atAl 1.
242. ChristianLegal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2990.
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whose characteristics are immutable."2 43 The word "status" suggests
that sexual orientation is one such characteristic. 2
It is not only the Supreme Court's more liberal members who
have inserted discreet kernels of language that can be used to promote
their idiosyncratic views of the law. Indeed, on the current Court "the
seed planters are the conservative justices, and it remains to be seen
whether they will be able to reap anywhere near as bountiful a harvest
as did Brennan."2 4 5 Court watchers continue to guess where these
seeds have been planted and when or if they will bloom in future
opinions.246
Finally, the individuality that pervades judicial decisions persists
despite the well-known increase in the practice of having law clerks
draft opinions. 247 Today, all of the Justices appear to have their clerks
write the first drafts of their opinions.248 Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that the Supreme Court Justices' chambers were "a
collection of nine autonomous opinion-writing bureaus."249 Critics
argue that this function of law clerks may diminish the insight and
sense of individual style that the judicial opinion offers.250 Opinions
written by law clerks, who are beginning their careers and as a result
write cautiously and in a more formulaic manner, are less likely to be
direct in their meaning.25 Yet, while opinions written by law clerks are
44

243. Liptak, supra note 241.
244. See id. ('The court is talking about gay people, not homosexuals, and about
people who have a social identity rather than a class of people who engage in particular sex
acts."' (quoting Professor Suzanne B. Goldberg)).
245. Marcus, supranote 216.
246. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Gaming the System: At the Supreme Court, Could
Legal PrecedentBe Less Important than PopularOpinion?, SLATE (Feb. 2, 2011, 5:32 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2283415 (examining the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of Justices
Scalia and Thomas to predict how they will rule on the constitutionality of the individual
healthcare mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code)).
247. Adam Liptak, A Sign of Courth Polarization: Choice of Clerks, N.Y TIMES,
Sept. 7, 2010, at Al.
248. Id
2 49. Id.
250. See POSNER, supra note 118, at 150 ("The sense of style that is inseparable from
the idea of a great judge in our tradition is unlikely to develop in a judge that does not do his
own writing. People are not born great writers; they become great writers by hard work-as
writers, not editors. And the struggle to compose a coherent opinion provides a more
searching test of the soundness of one's ideas than performing an editorial function does.").
251. See id at 145-46 ("The standard opinion style that has emerged [from the use of
law clerks] follows the style of the student-written sections of the law reviews-which is
hardly surprising when one considers who the law clerks are. The style tends to be colorless
and plethoric, and also heavily given to euphemism.... Instead of using language to
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generally of lower quality, the judge or justice will usually be
motivated by reputational concerns to edit and redraft these opinions
carefully if the opinion is attributed individually.'52 With a per curiam
opinion, however, judges do not have the same concerns and thus will
not be as thorough in editing opinions written by law clerks.253 At least
for signed opinions, "even stylistic discipline and platoons of law
clerks cannot extinguish the spark of personality from the work of
Justices who draw on emotion and experience, as well as intellect, in
shaping their judicial responses."254
Judges' individual style is reflected through tone and language
choice, both of which have implications for lower courts and
practitioners. Judges' unique personality and style are essential
components in the advancement and expansion of the law. Use of the
per curium attempts to force judges to relinquish their individuality,
thereby stunting the development of the law.
C

Judges as Lawmakers

Under the common law system in the United States, courts have
many functions. They develop the law through written opinions that
are binding authority for future cases; they offer guidance for fellow
judges, as well as for lawyers and litigants; they inform the public
about the status of legal issues; and they provide a framework for
lawyers, academics, and other legal practitioners analyzing those
issues.255 Judicial decisions thus create a public record that explains the
law.256 The handiwork of a particular judge in a particular case-the
highlight the things being discussed, the standard style draws a veil over reality, making it
harder to see exactly what the judge is doing.").
252. For a discussion of the reputational implications of attribution, see supra notes
85-97 and accompanying text.
253. See Burnett, supra note 121, at 28 (recognizing that, as an Idaho appellate court
judge, the author "was fully involved in crafting the substance of the percwiam opinions, but
[his] stylistic editing was lighter than [his] treatment of signed opinions").
254. Ray, supranote 194, at 195.
255. See generallyA. WHITNEY GRISWOLD, The Basis of a Rule of Law, in LIBERAL
EDUCATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL: AND OTHER ESSAYS 160, 161 (1959) ("Laws are

made by men, interpreted by men, and enforced by men, and in the continuous process,
which we call government, there is continuous opportunity for the human will to assert itself
This is true even of the common law. With its slow, seemingly automatic accumulation of
precedent, it may look to laymen like a coral reef. The legal philosopher knows it to be a
finely wrought cathedral.").
256. See Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Opinion Writing and Opinion Readers, 31
CARDOZO L. REv 1, 5-6 (2009) (asserting that the availability of written opinions strengthens
the courts' legitimacy to develop case law); Cappalli, supra note 179, at 286 (noting the
importance of the written judicial opinion in the U.S. legal system).
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decision itself, as well as the words and tone used to convey it-is a
window into that judge's jurisprudence, serving as an important
interpretative tool for judges, attorneys, and the general public.257
Written opinions are carefully scrutinized to extract information about
a judge's legal philosophy-information that is used to gain an
understanding about where the law stands on a specific issue, to
provide guidance regarding the direction in which the law is likely to
move, and to help frame arguments based on these determinations.258
Knowledge of an opinion's author provides a "useful shortcut" for
attorneys, allowing them to sort through an array of decisions and
examine particular opinions for hints regarding a judge's
jurisprudential or philosophical leanings on specific issues.25
This shortcut has been particularly important with the recent
turnover in the Supreme Court context. What was once known as the
O'Connor Court has become the Kennedy Court, illustrating the
importance and influence of Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and
Anthony Kennedy as the ideological center, and therefore the "swing
vote" of the Court in close cases.2" During her last five years on the
Court, Justice O'Connor voted with the majority in approximately
Because
three-fourths of the Court's five-to-four decisions."'
257. SeeAldisert et al., supo note 256, at 2-3 (stating that readers and users ofjudicial
opinions turn to the written opinion to quickly obtain information regarding the relevant
issues, legal precedent, and resulting rule of law).
258. See JosT, supia note 74, at 505-06 (observing that other careful readers of judicial
opinions include lobbyists, policy makers, and journalists).
259. See Stephen J.Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write TheirOpinions (And
Should We Care). 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1077, 1092 (2005) ("The dictates of formal
precedent aside, opinions by judicial superstars like Hand, Friendly, and Cardozo will
probably receive close scrutiny.").
260. See Charles Lane, Kennedy Reigns Supreme on Court WASH. POST, July 2, 2006,
at A6 ("It was the O'Connor court. Now it may be the Kennedy court."); see also Ramesh
Ponnuru, Sandra k Day: Why the Rehnquist Court Has Been the O'ConnorCourt,and How
To Replace Her (Should It Come to That), NAT'L REv (June 30, 2003), http://old.national
review.com/flashback/ponnuru200507011211 .asp; Editorial, The O'Connor Court, WASH.
POST (July 2, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/01/AR
2005070101835.html; Lyle Denniston, The 'Kennedy Court,'Only More So, SCOTUSBLOG
(Apr. 9, 2010, 6:49 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/the-kennedy-court-only-moreso/. But see Linda Greenhouse, Is the 'Kennedy Court' Over?, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2010),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.coml2010/07/15/rethinking-the-kennedy-court/ (concluding
that the era of the "Kennedy Court" is over because Justice Kennedy is much more likely to
align with the Court's conservative members, and thus he no longer has the same influence as
an in-play swing vote).
261. See End of Term Statistics andAnalysis--OctoberTerm 2005, SCOTUSBLOG, 2
(June 29, 2006), http://www.scotusblog.com/archives/EndoffermAnalysis.pdf (determining
that Justice O'Connor was in the majority in both of the two five-to-four decisions in which
she participated); End of Term Statistics andAnalysis-October Term 2004, SCOTUSBLOG,
1 (June 30, 2005), http://www.scotusblog.com/archives/FinalOT04StatsMemo.pdf (14 of 24

2012]

PER CURIAM OPINIONS

1237

persuading Justice O'Connor often was the difference between
winning and losing, attorneys tailored their arguments to appeal to her
judicial philosophy. 262 As a result, the Court's jurisprudence reflected
her "sensibilities and preferences" more than those of any other
Justice,263 and her voice became the law in many areas.2 6
Since Justice O'Connor's retirement, Justice Kennedy has been in
the majority in eighty-two percent of the Court's five-to-four
decisions. 265 Today, the "court's major rulings, on presidential power,
environmental law and other issues, reflect[] his moderately
conservative, but often fiercely independent, view of the law." 266
Attorneys must now appeal to Justice Kennedy's "distinct approach to
constitutional interpretation," which fluctuates all over the
decisions); Statisticsfor the Supreme Court October Term 2003, SCOTUSBLOG, 2 (July 13,
2004), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/1/otO3stats.pdf (16 of 21
decisions); Statistics for the Supreme Courth October Term 2002, SCOTUSBLOG, 2,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/OT02.pdf (last visited May 13, 2012)
(13 of 15 decisions); Statisticsfor the Supreme Courth October Term 2001, SCOTUSBLOG,
2, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/O01.pdf (last visited May 13,
2012) (15 of 21 decisions); Statistics for the Supreme Courth October Term 2000,
SCOTUSBLOG, 2, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/OTOO.pdf (last
visited May 13, 2012) (20 of 26 decisions).
262. See The O'Connor Court, supra note 260 (noting that Justice O'Connor was
"allergic" to the broad principles that appealed to her more ideological colleagues and
generally decided cases on their particular facts, leaving her with room to maneuver in a later
case); Ponnuru, supra note 260 ("Justice O'Connor gets her way more often than the [C]hief
[J]ustice does. As the 'swing vote' on the Court, O'Connor is in the majority more often than
any of her colleagues. Legal briefs in important cases are written to appeal, above all, to
her.").
263. The O'ConnorCouZ supra note 260.
264. See Joan Biskupic, O'ConnorEm Ends at Court, Continues in Law, USA TODAY
(Jan. 29, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-01-29-oconnor-analysis-x.
htm (examining Justice O'Connor's career and analyzing the legal standards she set in such
divisive and important areas as abortion, religious displays in public places, and affirmative
action); supra notes 207-214 and accompanying text (exploring the role of Justice O'Connor
in crafting the "undue burden" standard for abortion cases).
265. End-of-Term StatisticalAnalysis-OctoberTerm 2010, supra note 139, at 3; Stat
Pack for October Term 2010, supra note 68, at 11. The End-of-Term StatisticalAnalysisOctober Term 2010 notes that, since the beginning of the Roberts Court, Justice Kennedy's
majority votes in five-to-four cases have surpassed those of all other Justices. End-of-Term
StatisticalAnalysis-OctoberTerm 2010, supra note 139, at 3. Kennedy was in the majority
in 14 of 16 cases in 2010, 11 of 16 cases in 2009, 19 of 23 cases in 2008, 8 of 12 cases in
2007, and 24 of 24 cases in 2006. End-of-Term StatisticalAnalysis-October Term 2010,
supa note 139, at 3; Stat Packfor October Term 2010, supm note 68, at 11. Furthermore, 68
of these 75 decisive votes came in cases in which the Court was divided ideologically
between "right" (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) and "left"
(Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg). End-of-Term StatisticalAnalysis-October
Term 2010, supm note 139, at 3; StatPackfor OctoberTerm 2010,supra note 68, at 11.
266. Editorial, The FragileKennedy Cour N.Y. TIMEs (July 7, 2006), http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/07/07/opinionL/07fti lhtml.
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sociopolitical map, ranging from progressive views of the First
Amendment and personal liberties, while maintaining a more
conservative approach to abortion and other social values stemming
from his Catholicism. 2 67 Justice Kennedy's previous explanations
regarding relevant areas of the law are significant to understanding
how the Court will rule on a particular issue.268 Simply stated, litigants
will want to know whether and how Justice Kennedy has written on
their issue. The per curiam label, however, raises the possibility that
his unattributed explanations will go unnoticed.
Use of the per curiam strips an opinion of an important tool that
judges, attorneys, and the public rely on in analyzing and comprehending court decisions. Much like a pitcher with an anonymous
umpire, judges and attorneys are unable to tailor their arguments
effectively when pitching to a court or judge whose pattern of decision
making has been obscured by the per curiam. Attributed opinions
reflect how each member of the Court has "contributed a view, a way
of writing, a way of thinking, [and] a way of approaching [various]
topic[s],"269 helping to establish an individual Justice's unique strike
zone. The author of an opinion must reveal his identity for readers to
understand properly the unique judicial philosophy, individual
motivation, and personality behind the opinion's language.270
V.

EXCEPTIONS

The per curiam opinon raises troubling issues regarding judicial
accountability and poses a threat to the development of the law by
masking the opinion's author and his or her respective jurisprudence.
There are instances, however, in which the use of a per curiam may be
appropriate without implicating these concerns. These opinions
generally employ formulaic, boilerplate language that is silent on the
unique facts of the case or application of the law to those facts.
Further, these decisions are truly unanimous; the result is so obvious
that no Justice feels the need to write separately. The Supreme Court
does not follow clear guidelines in issuing its dispositions, so it is
THE FULL AND
267. FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY'S JURISPRUDENCE:
NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY 170-71 (2009).
268. TooBIN, supra note 136, at 327; Adam Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in
Decades,N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at Al.
269. THE SUPREME COURT: A C-SPAN BOOK FEATURING THE JUSTICES INTHEIR OWN
WORDS 160 (Brian Lamb et al. eds., 2010) (quoting Justice Sotomayor).
270. See Shawn J. Bayern, Case Interpretation,36 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 125, 134-35
(2009) (stating that individually composed opinions make it easier for a reader to identify the
intent that motivated a particular decision).
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difficult to carve out exceptions based on the type of disposition
involved. Nevertheless, there are certain situations in which the Court
generally uses formulaic language for a unanimous opinion; in these
situations the per curiam may be appropriate.
One such situation is when the Court dismisses certiorari as
improvidently granted. In its most basic form, a DIG simply reads,
"The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.""'
Similarly, the Court might issue a formulaic per curiam when it
decides to vacate and remand after oral argument. In these situations,
the per curiam reads that "[tihe judgment is vacated, and the case is
remanded to [the lower court] for further consideration in light of" a
case, statute, or factual development that the Court believes warrants
reconsideration.272 Attribution of these opinions would have little
value, because the boilerplate language does not directly address the
particular factual and legal issues in the case. As soon as a court's
language moves beyond the simple boilerplate, however, it begins to
provide opportunities to hold judges accountable and to provide insight
regarding where the law stands on an issue, the direction in which the
law is likely to move, and how to frame legal arguments. When
moving beyond boilerplate language, therefore, the per curiam is no
longer appropriate and the decision should be attributed.2' Any
271. See, e.g., Tolentino v. New York, 131 S. Ct. 1387, 1388 (2011) (per curiam);
Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (per curiam); Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams,
556 U.S. 178, 179 (2009) (per curiam); Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55, 56 (2008) (per curiam);
Toledo-Flores v. United States, 549 U.S. 69 (2006) (per curiam).
272. See, e.g., Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (per curiam) ("The
judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Skflling v United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896
(2010)."); Dep't of State v. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc., 519 U.S. 1
(1996) (per curiam) ("The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for further consideration in light of
[section] 633 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
.. "); Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 515 U.S. 321, 322 (1995) (per curiam) ("The judgment is
vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit for further consideration in light of Johnson v Jones, [515 U.S. 304
(1995)]."); Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (per curiam) ("The judgment is vacated
and the case is remanded to the 19th Judicial District Court of Louisiana for further
consideration in light of Washington v Harper,494 U.S. 210 (1990).").
273. See, e.g., Roper v. Weaver, 550 U.S. 598 (2007) (per curiam) (three-page opinion
dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted); Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (per
curiam) (six-page opinion dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted); Mitchell v.
Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970) (per curiam) (four-page opinion vacating and remanding for
lack of jurisdiction). The per curiam might seem appropriate for a GVR because of its
generally formulaic language; when a GVR contains only boilerplate language, however, the
Court issues it as an order, and therefore not as an opinion, per curiam or otherwise. See,
eg., City of Reno v. Conn, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011) ("Petition for writ of certiorari granted.

1240

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 86:1197

language that explains a court's reasoning for a disposition, whether
factual or legal, implicates the accountability and development of the
law, concerns described above.
Similar concerns arise when separate opinions follow a per
curiam decision. In these instances, the existence of separate opinions
reveals that the matter is not routine and well-settled, but rather that
some important aspect of the case is subject to conflicting
interpretations. When the separate opinion is a concurrence, this
suggests that the court could have reached the result in a different
manner. A dissent, on the other hand, calls into question both the
court's reasoning and the result.274 In both of these situations, the result

Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit for further consideration in light of Connick v Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011)."
(citation omitted)); Baker v. Buss, 131 S. Ct. 1715 (2011) ("[P]etition for a writ of certiorari
granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of Wall v Khoh, 131 S. Ct. 1278 (2011)."
(citation omitted)); Allshouse v. Pennsylvania, 131 S. Ct. 1597, 1598 (2011) ("Petition for
writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, Western District, for further consideration in light of Michigan v Bryant, 131
S. Ct. 1143 (2011)." (citation omitted)); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 131 S. Ct. 1567
(2011) ("Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the
Supreme Court of Georgia for further consideration in light of Bruesewitz v Wyeth LLC, 131
S. Ct. 1068 (2011)." (citation omitted)). The Supreme Court issues hundreds of these GVR
orders each Term. Bruhl, supm note 59, at 715. A GVR is issued as a per curiam only when
the Court's language expands beyond the formulaic language of these orders. Eg., Bell v.
Cone, 543 U.S. 447 (2005) (per curiam). The situation is similar when the Court bars a
petitioner from all future in formapaupens petitions. When formulaic, these dispositions are
issued as orders; when issued as per curiam opinions, these opinions tend to elaborate beyond
the appropriate scope of the per curiam. Compare Simon v. Bickell, 131 S. Ct. 1796 (2011)
(issuing a boilerplate order denying motion for n forma paupens and petition for writ of
certiorari and stating that, because petitioner has "repeatedly abused this Court's process, the
Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner
unless the docketing fee .. . is paid"), Brown v. Small, 131 S. Ct. 1686 (2011) (same), and
Cluck v. Vail, 131 S. Ct. 1689 (2011) (same), withAttwood v. Singletary, 516 U.S. 297 (1996)
(per curiam) (taking a page and a half to describe petitioner's abuse of the hi formapaupens
petition process and bar prospective filings), and Martin v. D.C. Ct. of App., 506 U.S. 1
(1992) (per curiam) (explaining for two pages why all n forma paupens petitions from
petitioner are prospectively denied). Further, I do not believe that per curiam summary
dispositions that move beyond boilerplate language ought to be permitted, whether or not
they are unanimous. For examples of cases decided in the 2011 Supreme Court Term, see
Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987 (2012) (unanimous eight-page opinion); Perry v. Perez, 132 S.
Ct. 934 (2012) (eleven-page opinion followed by two-page concurrence); Bobby v. Dixon,
132 S. Ct. 26 (2011) (per curiam) (unanimous ten-page opinion); KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132
S. Ct. 23 (2011) (per curiam) (unanimous five-page opinion); Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2
(2011) (per curiam) (eight-page opinion followed by nine-page dissent).
274. See Jacobson, supra note 17, at 197 ("Dissent here plays an unusual, dual role: it
registers the minority's disagreement with the underlying decision but also its objection to the
majority's implicit invocation of a norm of unanimity.").
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is not automatic and the reasoning is not formulaic.2 "' Therefore, the
main opinion should be signed by its author. The per curiam opinion
is thus appropriate only in a narrow class of situations in which courts
use only formulaic, boilerplate language to dispose of the matter
before it and when there are no separate opinions attached to it.
VI. CONCLUSION

The per curiam label first appeared on a simple, procedural
United States Supreme Court decision in the nineteenth century. Since
that time, the per curiam has evolved to apply to more substantive
decisions. Because judges are held accountable individually through
the signed opinion, which ensures diligent effort, consistency, and
fidelity to the law, the expanded use of the per curiam frustrates this
accountability. Furthermore, in deciding and writing judicial opinions,
judges leave their individual mark on the law through their personality
and style. Today, the law and its direction are controlled by the
nuances of language, and most Supreme Court decisions are
accompanied by opinions in which the Justices offer their unique
views on the issues at hand. Individuality is apparent even in per
curiam opinions, supposedly "by the court," which makes attribution
critical for the development of the law. Anonymity in judicial
decisions should be reserved only for a narrow set of opinions in
which formulaic, boilerplate language leaves no legitimate room for
individual expression.
Just as pitchers calibrate their pitches to the particular strike zone
of the home plate umpire, lawyers tailor their arguments to the
individual views of the judges hearing their case.276 Although umpires
wear masks, their identity is known the instant they make a call.
275. For example, Chief Justice Roberts wrote a six-page dissent (in which he was
joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Sotomayor) from the Court's formulaic DIG in
Robertson v United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184 (2010) (per curiam). For an
example from the 2011 Supreme Court Term, see Cavazos, 132 S. Ct. 2 (per curiam), which
contained an eight-page summary reversal, followed by Justice Ginsburg's nine-page dissent
(joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor). See also Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 1195
(2012) (six-page summary reversal followed by three-page dissent).
276. Stephen Himes, John Roberts and the Supreme Sike Zone, FLAK MAG. (Oct. 30,
2007), http://www.flakmag.com/opinion/roberts.html. The author states:
Because the exact location of the strike zone depends on the umpire,
pitchers calibrate their game plans to who's behind the plate. ... Lawyers do the
same thing: If Solicitor General Paul Clement is facing a probable 5-4 school
integration case, he's going to pound the Anthony Kennedy strike zone over the
inside-right corner-but not off the edge, in the Scalia/Thomas wheelhouse.
Id
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Judges, on the other hand, wear a shroud of anonymity when they use
the per curiam; nobody knows who called strike three.

